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SUSPECT SPHERES, NOT ENUMERATED POWERS:
A GUIDE FOR LEAVING THE LAMPPOST
Richard Primus* & Roderick M . Hills, Jr .**
Despite longstanding orthodoxy, the Constitution’s enumeration of congres-
sional powers does virtually nothing to limit federal lawmaking . That’s not
because of some bizarrely persistent judicial failure to read the Constitution
correctly . It’s because the enumeration of congressional powers is not a well-
designed technology for limiting federal legislation . Rather than trying to
make the enumeration do work that it will not do, decisionmakers should
find better ways of thinking about what lawmaking should be done locally
rather than nationally . This Article suggests such a rubric, one that asks not
whether Congress has permission to do a certain thing but whether a certain
kind of lawmaking is more prone to pathology at the national or the state
level . That inquiry could identify “suspect spheres”: areas of policymaking
where federal law calls for more justification than elsewhere . Federal legisla-
tion within suspect spheres would not necessarily be subject to judicial invali-
dation, but the judgment that legislation falls within a suspect sphere could
underwrite softer forms of judicial resistance to nationalization . We illustrate
the suspect-spheres model with a principle of federalism we call the corporate
nondelegation doctrine, by which federal delegations of power to private cor-
porations are to be treated skeptically . Early on, that principle animated
Madison’s opposition to the Bank of the United States and much of the Jack-
sonian approach to federalism . It later underwrote the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Schechter Poultry . In the current century, the idea that the corporate
nondelegation doctrine defines a suspect sphere helps explain otherwise puz-
zling judicial behaviors in federalism cases, including the presumption
against preemption and the resistance to the individual mandate of the Af-
fordable Care Act . By illustrating the possibility of a suspect-sphere approach,
we suggest a tool that might be useful at a time of destructively polarized na-
tional politics, when rubrics for allocating some polarizing issue spaces to
state-level decisionmakers might help lower the national temperature .
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INTRODUCTION
Officially, the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers
marks the boundary between two domains. Within the domain of its enu-
merated powers, Congress may legislate, subject to limits like those in the
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Bill of Rights. Outside that domain, legislative power belongs exclusively to
the states. 1 The official account further imagines significant space on each
side of the line and, more pointedly, that the zone of exclusive state jurisdic-
tion is bigger than the zone where Congress may act. In James Madison’s
oft-quoted words, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in
the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” 2
This official picture bears little resemblance to the way American feder-
alism actually works. In reality, Congress is not much limited by its enumer-
ated powers, and national lawmaking is normal across a very broad swath of
policymaking space. Moreover, the enumeration’s failure to confine Con-
gress to a smaller domain does not reflect some bizarre judicial inability to
understand and enforce the Constitution. It is consistent with constitutional
text, history, and structure, and it accords with longstanding practice. As a
historical matter, it is probably a mistake to think that the guiding purpose
behind the drafting of Article I, Section 8 was the limitation of federal legis-
lative power. 3 And as a conceptual matter, the Constitution’s enumeration of
congressional powers is not well suited for marking limits beyond which the
national government cannot go. So it should not be surprising that courts
have been unable to use the enumeration as the basis for any practically suc-
cessful set of rules for limiting national power. “Enumerationism,” to use
Professor David Schwartz’s term, is a failed ideology of federalism, one that
cannot explain either the content or the limits of Congress’s powers. 4
One might adjust to this reality by abandoning federalism-based limits
on Congress, except for those that are specifically established in the Consti-
tution’s text. 5 But alternative adjustments are also conceivable. Instead of
trying to identify what should be left to the states by making negative infer-
ences from the list of enumerated congressional powers, perhaps constitu-
1. E .g ., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018) (“The
Constitution confers on Congress not plenary legislative power but only certain enumerated
powers. Therefore, all other legislative power is reserved for the States, as the Tenth Amend-
ment confirms.” (emphasis added)).
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). “Oft-
quoted” is not the same as “well-understood”: Federalist 45 is a warning that the states may be
too powerful relative to the national government, not a celebration of limits on national power.
One might add that “oft-quoted” is also not the same as “plausible”: it is not clear that a Con-
stitution specifying between thirty and forty congressional powers (depending on how one
counts) creates a Congress whose powers are “few.”
3. See infra Section I.B.5.
4. See David S. Schwartz, McCulloch v. Maryland and the Incoherence of Enumeration-
ism, 19 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45 (2021); David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising:
Implied Powers, Capable Federalism, and the Limits of Enumerationism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573
(2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, Limits of Enumerationism].
5. For instance, the prohibition on unilaterally redrawing the existing map of states in
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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tional decisionmakers 6 could think directly about what sorts of national
lawmaking should be treated as suspect.
Many readers will be skittish about going down that road. Identifying
domains in which Congress should not legislate—even above and beyond
those that the Constitution textually proscribes—calls to mind the “tradi-
tional government functions” test from National League of Cities. 7 And Na-
tional League of Cities was a failure. 8 In recent decades, analysts have
accordingly been skeptical that courts have the institutional capacity to iden-
tify and enforce affirmative federalism-based limits beyond those spelled out
in the Constitution’s text. 9
To a significant extent, we share that skepticism. We also recognize,
however, that the fall of National League of Cities has coexisted with contin-
ued assertions by constitutional decisionmakers that some sorts of congres-
sional lawmaking not proscribed by the Constitution’s text are disfavored on
federalism grounds. Sometimes, as in the commandeering cases, the concern
is that federal law must not interfere unduly with the operations of state gov-
ernments. 10 At other times, the concern has been that Congress might inap-
propriately federalize specific policy domains. 11
We do not believe that all these concerns have been well-founded. Fed-
eral law is present in pretty much every policy domain—in our view, un-
problematically so. Our aim in pointing out that constitutional practice
robustly features arguments like these is not to endorse the view that Con-
gress must stay its hand in any particular policy areas. Instead, the present
point is about the kinds of arguments constitutional decisionmakers have
typically made when advocating (categorical or presumptive) limits on fed-
eral legislation. Despite the official account, those arguments have often pro-
ceeded by identifying areas where Congress should not legislate, rather than
by looking at Congress’s enumerated powers and asking what is left out. For
the most part, decisionmakers have long behaved—and properly so—as if
Congress has the power to legislate in general, except where its legislation
would bump up against some limiting principle.
6. We use the term “constitutional decisionmakers” to refer to public officials who ex-
ercise power over issues of constitutional significance, whether in the judiciary or otherwise.
Constitutional decisionmakers thus include, but are not limited to, legislators and executive
officials as well as judges. As we explain, we imagine that judges would have a limited role in
enforcing a suspect-spheres regime like the one we describe.
7. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8. See, e .g ., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
9. See, e .g ., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2008 (2009).
10. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
11. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(identifying the preference for regulating schools locally as a consideration weighing in favor of
invalidating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act).
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To express that thought with a set of modern terms, the federalism-
based limits under which Congress labors have mostly been external limits
(that is, affirmative prohibitions) rather than internal limits (that is, limits
inhering in the grant of powers to Congress). 12 Sometimes these external
limits are enforced directly, as when a court strikes down federal law because
it trenches on some unwritten state prerogative. Anticommandeering deci-
sions like Printz v . United States provide examples. 13 Sometimes these limits
are enforced in softer ways, as with clear-statement rules used to construe
federal statutes narrowly. A recent example is Bond v . United States. 14 And
the source of federalism-based resistance to Congress in cases like Printz and
Bond is not to be found in anything about the Constitution’s enumeration of
congressional powers. To map the zones of resistance, one needs to treat fed-
eralism-based limits on national lawmaking as affirmative principles whose
sources mostly lie outside that enumeration. Indeed, they mostly lie outside
the constitutional text entirely.
This Article has two aims. The first is to show the impracticality of gen-
erating sensible limits on national lawmaking by reference to the enumerat-
ed powers of Congress. The second is to sketch a potential alternative.
Rather than defining a zone of exclusive state jurisdiction consisting of
whatever residuum Congress’s enumerated powers do not reach, we recom-
mend identifying “suspect spheres” in which national lawmaking should be
presumptively disfavored. Those spheres need not be fixed and categorical
across time: they might shift as changing conditions alter the domains in
which skepticism toward national lawmaking is reasonable. The challenge,
therefore, is not to identify a static list of suspect spheres but to articulate the
tools that decisionmakers should use to identify legislation as suspect and
then to apply the appropriate suspicion.
To be successful, such an approach must meet three criteria. First, rather
than being deduced from the text of the enumeration, the content of the sus-
pect spheres must be products of constitutional construction, rooted in po-
litical and legal experience. 15 Second, the approach must not ask courts to
erect and police static limits on Congress, as National League of Cities tried
to do. We imagine that most of the constraining work within this model will
be done extrajudicially, by agencies and by Congress itself. 16 And when cases
12. See, e .g ., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-1, at 794–95
(3d ed. 2000).
13. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a provision of the Brady Act).
14. 572 U.S. 844 (2014) (narrowly construing the Chemical Warfare Act).
15. For an account of the sources that go into constructing limits where text is missing,
see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641, 659–60 (2013).
16. Those officials might constrain themselves at least in part due to a good-faith desire
to exercise their power in ways that make the best use of American federalism. But that formu-
la does not only mean that officials might set constitutional principle above their policy goals
and partisan interests. As we will explain below, congressional self-restraint about legislating in
areas of suspect spheres can be motivated by a political party’s correctly perceiving its own self-
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do come to court, we believe in judicial deference to Congress’s judgment
that federal law is warranted, even within suspect spheres. But perhaps
courts can help prevent Congress (and the national executive) from reaching
such judgments lightly. For that purpose, we envision courts using “soft”
constraints like antipreemption and clear-statement canons, as well as some
limits on Chevron 17 and State Farm 18 deference to executive rulemaking. In
the most extreme case, where federal lawmakers regulated in a suspect
sphere and were utterly unable to produce a plausible explanation for doing
so, the stronger medicine of judicial review might be justified. 19 But such
cases should be rare, and even if they occurred, the relevant federal actions
would be held invalid only because insufficient reasons were given, not be-
cause legislation of a certain kind was off-limits.
Third and finally, a successful suspect-spheres approach would have to
deliver some substantively valuable benefit of federalism. Of the various ben-
efits that well-implemented federalism can deliver, one that is especially
needed right now is reducing the stakes of national politics. 20 Bitter and ac-
celerating conflict across the partisan divide is doing significant damage to
the constitutional system. 21 Limitations on the scope of national lawmaking
might reduce the temperature of that conflict—if those limitations were to
offer something important to people affiliated with both major parties. Lim-
its that appeal to only one side—say, by forbidding Congress to nationalize
health care or by preempting local gun control laws without delivering
something of comparable value to the other side of the aisle—would just ex-
acerbate the conflict. Limits appealing only to one side would also be unsta-
ble, because the other side would have no incentive to respect that limit
when it holds the levers of national power (including the judicial levers). But
interest. In particular, it can be motivated by a party’s desire to limit its losses when a different
party holds power, see infra Section II.A, or by a governing party’s interest in maintaining the
stability of its own political coalition, see infra Part III, or by a political party’s interest in tem-
pering the political opposition that its favored legislation might provoke, see infra Section IV.B.
17. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
19. We do not have a firm shared judgment on this question. We also wonder whether
the threat of judicial review might do most of the work and, if so, whether judicial review in
extreme cases could be limited to what is necessary to maintain the threat.
20. This potential benefit of federalism is not always the most important one, nor is it
always desirable. Depending on how it is practiced, federalism can have many effects, and
which ones are helpful and which harmful will often vary with the surrounding circumstances.
We are interested in useful federalism for the present and near future, and we make no pre-
tense of being able to make suggestions that would yield the best outcomes under all circum-
stances. On the contrary, the idea that there can be a set of institutional arrangements that
make sense under all circumstances strikes us as exhibiting the sort of static constitutional
thinking that has sustained the unhelpful practice of trying to settle questions about the proper
scope of national lawmaking by reference to the text of Article I, Section 8.
21. See, e .g ., STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018)
(analyzing the current polarization of American politics and comparing it to the extreme parti-
san polarization of failed democracies).
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if federal lawmaking could be limited by principles with some amount of
transpartisan appeal, those limits might be able to sustain constitutional coa-
litions—that is, coalitions of citizens in both parties strong enough to resist
each party’s temptation to renege on the compromise when it is in power. In
the best-case scenario, building such coalitions might be part of building a
healthier constitutional culture more broadly.
Readers might reasonably wonder whether any principles that could be
used to limit national lawmaking actually meet all of these criteria. To illus-
trate the possibility, we offer an example we call the corporate nondelegation
doctrine. Ever since the 1790s, Americans have worried about delegations of
federal power to private corporations. 22 To be sure, people have worried
about corporate power at every level of government, local as well as national.23
But corporate influence over national lawmaking has been particularly wor-
risome: partly because of fears that the national government is distinctively
susceptible to capture by networks of financial insiders, partly because the
national government has more capacity to do damage if captured. This re-
sistance to delegating national power to private corporations has often unit-
ed political coalitions capable of sustaining constitutional principles. We
illustrate that history by reference to episodes from the eighteenth, nine-
teenth, and twentieth centuries, from the struggles over the Bank of the
United States to the death of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 24
We also suggest that the corporate nondelegation doctrine helps explain
otherwise-perplexing features of twenty-first century federalism jurispru-
dence. Our leading examples are the principles governing statutory preemp-
tion 25 and the conflict over the individual mandate of the Affordable Care
Act. 26 In these domains, courts (and others) have been animated by intui-
tions that federal law is operating in domains where it should not. But as
long as constitutional lawyers look to the Constitution’s enumeration of
congressional powers as the guide to where federal law is and is not proper,
the real bases of those intuitions will remain obscure, and clearsighted deci-
sionmaking will be difficult. It would accordingly be wise to abandon the
idea that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers provides a
basis—let alone an authoritative basis—for dividing policy space between a
domain in which national lawmaking is appropriate and a domain in which
it is not.
Freeing ourselves of that myth does not mean abandoning federalism.
Federalism is enormously valuable, and it can and should be maintained. But
there is little point in preserving the idea of a limiting enumeration if in fact
22. See infra Part III.
23. In this Article, we use the term “local” to express what others mean by the more
cumbersome phrase “state and local.” Relative to nationwide legislation, state legislation is lo-
cal, and that is the contrast on which we focus.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Section IV.A.
26. See infra Section IV.B.
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the enumeration of congressional powers does little or no practical work for
federalism. And it doesn’t. The actual forces sustaining federalism have long
been a combination of external limits like the ones we explore and process
limits built into the structure of governmental decisionmaking. 27 Because
enumeration has not done much work, federalism would continue more or
less unchanged if we recognized the idea of a limiting enumeration as the
myth that it is. Except, of course, for one respect in which that recognition
would improve matters: setting aside the myth would let analysts and deci-
sionmakers focus more forthrightly on the actual reasons for federalism-
based limits on national lawmaking.
In Part I of this Article, we explain why the enumeration of congression-
al powers does not supply useful limits on national lawmaking. In Part II, we
describe the alternative of external limits in the form of suspect spheres. In
Part III, we use the corporate nondelegation doctrine to illustrate this alter-
native, tracing its role in constitutional federalism from the First Congress to
the New Deal. Finally, in Part IV, we show that the corporate nondelegation
doctrine is alive and consequential in the twenty-first century. We suggest
that better decisions could be made if we recognized it and things like it for
what they are: nontextual external limits on federal lawmaking, untethered
to anything in the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers.
There’s an old joke in which a police officer on night patrol comes
across a drunk man crouching under a lamppost. The officer asks the drunk
man what he is doing, and the drunk man explains that he lost his wallet and
is searching for it. Intending to be helpful, the officer crouches alongside the
drunk man and joins in the search for the wallet. After a minute or two of
looking without success, the officer asks the drunk man, “Where were you
when you lost your wallet?” The drunk man points to the other side of the
street. The officer, perplexed, asks the obvious next question: “So why are
you looking here?” “Well,” the drunk man says, “there’s no light over there.
Here, there’s a lamppost.”
Searching for sensible limits to national lawmaking by looking at the
Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers is a bit like looking for
the drunk man’s wallet under the lamppost. Something about the environ-
ment—the light, or the textual list of powers—makes it seem like an auspi-
cious place to look. But the thing being sought is not there to be found. To be
clear, there is no guarantee of success even if we look somewhere else. The
drunk man is not wrong to think that the other side of the street is dark. But
we know for certain what will happen if we look in the wrong place. The on-
ly rational alternatives are to look in another place or give up trying. One
way or the other, it is time for constitutional federalism to leave the lamppost.
27. See Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 605–06 (2014).
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I. HOW INTERNAL LIMITS FAIL TO IDENTIFY RESERVED STATE POWERS
Consider two ways to identify limits on Congress’s power to legislate.
First, one might try to reason from the Constitution’s textual enumeration of
congressional powers. Working from the premise that “[t]he enumeration of
powers is also a limitation of powers,” 28 one could reason that Congress can
do nothing except what the Constitution affirmatively specifies. According
to this expressio unius–style argument, the Constitution’s affirmative specifi-
cation of many congressional powers implies that every other type of legisla-
tive power belongs to some other legislator. 29 The Tenth Amendment
reinforces this perspective by providing that whatever powers the federal
government does not enjoy are reserved either “to the States . . . or to the
people.” 30 In keeping with a modern terminological convention, we call lim-
its rooted in the enumeration of powers internal limits, because they are de-
rived from—internal to—the grant of power itself. 31
By contrast, one might instead specify limits on Congress by focusing on
affirmative reasons why Congress should not enact certain kinds of legisla-
tion. Congress may not abridge the freedom of speech, 32 take private proper-
ty without just compensation, 33 or impose cruel and unusual punishments. 34
Laws transgressing those limits are unconstitutional even if they fit within
Congress’s enumerated powers. Think of a regulation of commerce that
takes private property or a law punishing counterfeiters by boiling them in
oil. The reasons why Congress may not enact such laws are rooted in consid-
erations located outside of—external to—the Constitution’s enumeration of
congressional powers. We call these external limits.
The external limits in the examples just given—no taking of private
property without just compensation, and no cruel and unusual punish-
ments—are rooted in considerations of individual rights. But external limits
can also be rooted in considerations of federalism. At the Founding, the Es-
tablishment Clause and the Second Amendment were both federalism-based
external limits: irrespective of Congress’s enumerated powers, the Estab-
lishment Clause blocked a type of legislation that might endanger the peace
of the Union if done centrally rather than locally, and the Second Amend-
28. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534 (2012).
29. Constitutional lawyers often capture this thought by quoting Chief Justice John
Marshall’s dictum that “[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.” Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). But Marshall was not saying that the Constitution’s
enumeration of congressional power indicates that some legislative projects are beyond Con-
gress’s ken, nor was he articulating a principle on which that conclusion would follow. The
traditional use of Marshall’s dictum as if he were endorsing those ideas is simply a misunder-
standing. See Richard Primus, The Gibbons Fallacy, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 567 (2017).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
31. 1 TRIBE, supra note 12.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33. Id . amend. V.
34. Id . amend. VIII.
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ment blocked a type of legislation that the central government might use to
arrogate power at the expense of the states. Other federalism-based external
limits on Congress include the prohibitions against Congress’s unilaterally
redrawing state boundaries, 35 dictating the location of a state’s capital, 36 or
taxing a state’s own tax revenue. 37
We argue below that judicial enforcement of federalism through internal
limits is doomed to failure. Neither the text nor the spirit of the enumeration
in Article I provides workable materials for any sensible theory of federalism.
A rational approach to constitutional federalism must recognize this fact.
A. Internal Versus External Limits
The Venn diagrams below use the distinction between internal and ex-
ternal limits to depict three conceptions of the relationship between state
and federal legislative power.
FIGURE 1
Figure 1 depicts a conventional (albeit contested) “internal limit” con-
ception of congressional power. This conception imagines that the enumer-
ated powers of Congress define a small space within the universe of potential
legislation. It then imagines an extensive residuum of exclusive state power
occupying the remainder of that universe. The striped oval represents areas
that are exclusively federal, like the power to declare war. The gray oval rep-
resents areas of concurrent federal and state power, where states can legislate
until and unless Congress legislates to the contrary. But even when com-
bined, Congress’s zones of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction form only a
moderately sized island in a vast sea. That image reflects Madison’s famous
statement—really, his lament—that federal powers “are few and defined,”
35. See id . art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
36. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 574 (1911).
37. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
■ States' exclusive residual powers 
~ c  ongress's exclusive powers 
Concurrent Congressional & 
State Powers 
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while those of “the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” 38 State
law is the presumptively normal form of law; federal law is the exception that
must be justified.
Note three consequences for reasoning about legislation that follow
from this image. First, the conception of national legislation as exceptional
focuses analysis on defining and justifying the island of federal power: the
question to be answered is “What, if anything, justifies Congress’s choice to
pass a law?” 39 Second, because it treats the vast black sea as an undifferenti-
ated whole, this conception has nothing to say about whether local control is
more important or more desirable in some areas within the states’ jurisdic-
tion than in others. Third, and by the same token, this conception has noth-
ing to say about whether some potential legislation lying within the gray
zone of concurrent power might still be better suited for local rather than na-
tional policymaking, such that Congress should think twice about acting
even though its action would fall within its enumerated powers.
Figure 1 bears little resemblance to reality. There is no meaningful sense
in which federal laws are a small island in a sea of reserved state powers, nor
has there been at any point in our lifetimes. Federal law is as normal a part of
our regulatory landscape as state law. All aspects of your job—wages and
hours, 40 working conditions, 41 hiring and promotion criteria, 42 collective
bargaining 43—are regulated by federal law. So is the air you breathe, 44 the car
you drive, 45 the food you eat, 46 the water you drink and clean with, 47 and the
energy that powers your home, office, farm, or factory. 48 And it is uncontro-
versial that Congress has authority to preempt a vast swath of the state law
that still remains in force, setting aside (for example) state laws regarding
torts, contracts, property, and crime. 49 State law remains immensely im-
portant, but not because it operates in a space that Congress cannot reach.
38. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 292.
39. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544
(1954) (“National action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intru-
sion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case.”).
40. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
41. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678.
42. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
43. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
44. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
45. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,323 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85, 86,
600; 49 C.F.R. pt. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538).
46. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i.
47. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388.
48. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201–6422.
49. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (recognizing the common
practice of “having state law pre-empted by federal regulation”).
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The actual scope of the states’ exclusive legislative domains, therefore, looks
more like the black zones in Figure 2 below than the black field in Figure 1:
FIGURE 2
The sphere of exclusive federal power (striped) could still be imagined as a
small subset of all possible legislative power. But the zone of concurrent fed-
eral and state authority occupies the vast majority of the space. The residu-
um of exclusive state jurisdiction is less like an encompassing sea and more
like a few discrete ponds on the margins of the law. Laws penalizing the mere
possession of firearms that have never traveled in interstate commerce, for
instance, would fall into one of those corner patches of black. 50 But laws reg-
ulating the possession of firearms that have moved in interstate commerce—
a large majority of all guns—do not. 51
To be sure, state law can still regulate firearms that move in interstate
commerce. States regulate not only in their exclusive-power zones but also in
the large (gray) zone where their power is concurrent with that of Congress,
so long as the specific legislation they enact is not preempted. There is a lot
of important state law out there. Our earlier list of areas regulated by federal
statute—your job, your car, your food, the very air around you—is also a list
of things regulated by state law. Most of the social world is subject to both
state and national legislation, until and unless Congress makes itself the ex-
clusive authority through preemption.
The systems that Figures 1 and 2 depict are different—obviously and
radically so. But they share something important. Although exclusive state
jurisdiction is large in Figure 1 and small in Figure 2, both diagrams present
the allocation of powers between national and local legislatures exclusively
by reference to what Congress is allowed to do. In neither diagram does any
50. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 because it did not require a connection to interstate commerce).
51. See United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding reenact-
ed Gun-Free School Zones Act).
■ States' exclusive residual powers 
~ C ' I . ongress s exc us1ve powers 
Concurrent Congressional & 
State Powers 
May 2021] Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers 1443
part of the analysis ask whether some area of law is particularly important
for states to control. Nor—and this is not the same thing—does any part of
the analysis ask whether some sorts of lawmaking are likely to go badly if
done at the national level. As a result, these ways of thinking make no space
for the possibility that Congress may have the enumerated power to enact a
piece of legislation that, for federalism reasons, it should not.
Consider: Congress has an enumerated power to lay and collect taxes. 52
A federal law requiring states to pay 100 percent of the money that they col-
lect as tax revenue to the federal treasury would be, straightforwardly, a law
for the laying and collecting of taxes. It would also be a terrible idea for fed-
eralism reasons: it would destroy a great deal of the states’ ability to govern.
We have little trouble saying that such a federal tax law would be unconstitu-
tional. The reason for that unconstitutionality, however, cannot be discerned
by examining the enumerated powers of Congress. Instead, the reason turns
on a need of the states, or, put differently, on the destructiveness of a certain
kind of national lawmaking, even though that lawmaking falls within the
textually specified powers of Congress. Such considerations are invisible in
an account that takes the enumeration of congressional powers as the basis
for allocating legislative powers among state and national legislatures. On
any such account—whether it looks like Figure 1 or Figure 2—the zones in
which state jurisdiction cannot be overridden by federal law have no internal
coherence. They are random snippets left over when the set of congressional
powers is subtracted, like the oddly shaped and practically useless bits of
cloth left over after a tailor cuts out pieces for a suit.
Contrast this internal-limit approach to Congress’s powers with the ex-
ternal-limit approach visualized in Figure 3 below:
FIGURE 3
In Figure 3, everything within the gray square, including the interior of
the two circles, is within the enumerated powers of Congress. But within that
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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overall space, a particular zone is carved out as belonging presumptively to
the states on the basis of considerations that override Congress’s enumerated
powers. Thus, the black circle representing presumptive state jurisdiction is
not defined merely as a space in which Congress’s enumerated powers have
run out. A federal law might be an exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers
and yet fall within the black zone, rendering the law unconstitutional on fed-
eralism grounds. So the black space is not a residuum. It is an affirmative re-
serve.
In this third model, which we think is both more sensible and closer to
reality than Figures 1 and 2, the zone of presumptive state jurisdiction is not
determined by reference to the enumerated powers of Congress. It is defined
by factors independent of—external to—the enumeration, such as the im-
portance of a state’s being able to make certain kinds of laws or the danger of
letting certain kinds of laws be made at the national level. Sometimes these
two conditions are opposite sides of the same coin. At other times, one is at
work rather than the other.
To explore the value of thinking in the way that Figure 3 suggests, con-
sider the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering doctrines. In its first anti-
commandeering decision, New York v . United States, the Court rested its
analysis on a historical claim about the Founders’ having deliberately reject-
ed a system in which Congress operated directly on the states and a structur-
al claim about democratic accountability. 53 In the second
anticommandeering decision, Printz v . United States, the Court added an ar-
gument about traditional practice (i.e., that Congress through American his-
tory has not commandeered state officials and that Congress’s self-restraint
on this point has signaled its awareness of a constitutional limitation) 54 and
an argument that letting Congress conscript the resources and personnel of
all fifty state governments would instantly make the federal government
much more powerful than it would otherwise be. 55 Reasonable people disa-
gree about the strength of these rationales. For present purposes, what mat-
ters is that all these considerations are matters of history and structure. None
of them is about the text of the enumerated powers of Congress, nor even
about the purpose or the spirit of the enumeration. Indeed, New York’s and
Printz’s arguments about the Founders or political accountability or tradi-
tional practice would be just as strong (or weak) if the Constitution expressly
gave Congress a general police power. So on the understanding that consid-
erations like these are the justifications for the anticommandeering doc-
trines, those doctrines are external limits on the powers of Congress, rooted
in considerations lying outside the Constitution’s enumeration of congres-
sional powers. They occupy the black circle in Figure 3, defined not by the
edge-of-the-picture triangles in Figure 2 but rather by principles independ-
ent of the shape of Congress’s powers.
53. 505 U.S. 144, 163–69 (1992).
54. 521 U.S. 898, 905–11 (1997).
55. Id . at 922.
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B. The Limits of Textual Inference
Constitutional interpreters commonly try to use the textual enumeration
of congressional powers as a basis for reasoning about what sorts of legisla-
tion should be left to the states. Considered more carefully, however, the
constitutional text cannot do the work that these interpretive moves require.
In the end, the texts of the clauses specifying congressional powers cannot
provide adequate guidance for identifying types of legislation that should
(conclusively or presumptively) be within the domain of states.
1. “The Enumeration Presupposes Something Not Enumerated”
There are various inspirations for using the enumeration to identify
types of legislation that Congress should not pass: the Tenth Amendment,
the expressio unius canon, and (a misunderstanding of) Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s dictum that “[t]he enumeration presupposes something not enumer-
ated.” 56 On this view, the fact that the Constitution affirmatively lists a
bunch of specific congressional powers shows that Congress enjoys less than
general legislative jurisdiction. 57
This way of thinking has important limits. For one, it is not true that the
Constitution’s enumeration of powers and the rule stated by the Tenth
Amendment necessarily preclude Congress from regulating any particular
thing. Sometimes a set of enumerated powers turns out, in practice, to cover
all the ground that a grant of general jurisdiction would. 58 A legislature with
seven enumerated powers would have the power to do anything that a legis-
lature of general jurisdiction had the power to do if the seven enumerated
powers were the power to make law applicable on Sundays, the power to
make law applicable on Mondays, and so forth. Whether any particular set of
enumerated powers amounts to something less than a power of general ju-
risdiction is a question that can only be answered at retail, by looking at the
specific set of powers granted and asking whether they leave some part of the
social world uncovered. Maybe, as applied to the circumstances of the social
world in 2020, the enumerated powers of Congress are sufficient warrant for
anything that Congress might choose to legislate, subject to the blocking
force of external limits. Or maybe not. The Supreme Court has given the lat-
ter answer. 59 But for reasons one of us has explained at length elsewhere, it is
56. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). On why it is a misreading of
Marshall to think this dictum means that the enumeration of congressional powers limits the
scope of Congress’s legislative jurisdiction, see Primus, supra note 29.
57. See, e .g ., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective Action
Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123, 2128–30 (2012).
58. See Primus, supra note 27, at 636–37.
59. See, e .g ., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act unwarrant-
ed by Congress’s enumerated powers).
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a mistake to think that there must be things left over. 60 What David Schwartz
has called the “mustbesomething rule” 61—that is, the idea that the enumera-
tion of powers signals that there must be something congressional power
does not reach—is simply a fallacy.
But even if it were true that the enumerated powers of Congress must
leave something unreachable by federal legislation, that interpretive principle
would not help in identifying which domains of legislation should be off lim-
its. The idea that the enumerated powers must leave something beyond Con-
gress’s reach is the animating principle of Lopez, 62 and in the twenty-six
years since Lopez, the application of this principle has led only to the sort of
exclusive state jurisdiction pictured in Figure 2, in which Congress is denied
power over disconnected and marginal bits of the social world. Congress
cannot regulate the possession of firearms that have not moved in interstate
commerce, 63 and Congress cannot create a private cause of action for victims
of gender-motivated violence as a remedy for purely intrastate crimes. 64
Those limitations matter in the lives of the people affected by those specific
rules. But those limitations play no functional role in a system of helpful fed-
eralism, unless “federalism” just means “blocking exercises of national power
in a couple of disconnected places.” Put differently, if all that the enumera-
tion of powers can say about what sorts of legislation should be left to states
is said in Lopez and Morrison—or even Lopez, Morrison, and three or four
other cases like them—then the enumeration of powers has little of value to
say on the topic.
2. Inferences from Absences
Interpreters who would like to identify specific domains of reserved state
power by imagining the photographic negative of Congress’s enumerated
powers might press their case, however, by reasoning from apparently spe-
cific omissions from Congress’s arsenal, rather than from the fact of the
enumeration overall. The intuition is easy to grasp. If we tell our students
that class will meet on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, they will reasonably
understand us to mean that class will not meet on Tuesday and Thursday (to
say nothing of Saturday and Sunday). The same logic can be applied to con-
stitutional clauses. For example, Congress has the power to regulate com-
merce “with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.” 65 Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote that the specification
60. See Primus, supra note 27.
61. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION 242 (2019).
62. See 514 U.S. at 567 (stating that Congress’s enumerated powers must not be con-
strued so as to recognize congressional power tantamount “to a general police power”).
63. Id . at 565–68.
64. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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of three kinds of commerce implied the existence of a fourth—purely intra-
state commerce—to which the power given in this clause does not extend. 66
But an interpreter who treated this interpretive move as generally valid
would go badly astray. Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 gives Congress the power
to coin money. 67 The next clause gives Congress the power “[t]o provide for
the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the
United States.” 68 If the affirmative specification of particular congressional
powers implies the absence of other powers of the same kind that the Consti-
tution does not affirmatively specify, then the affirmative specification of a
congressional power to criminalize counterfeiting would imply that Con-
gress lacks the power to criminalize tax evasion. After all, the Constitution’s
express grant to Congress of a power to protect the money it coins by pun-
ishing counterfeiters stands in clear contrast to the Constitution’s omission
of a congressional power to impose punishments in aid of its power to col-
lect taxes. On this interpretation, Congress would have the power to lay and
collect taxes but no power to provide for the punishment of those who do
not pay their taxes.
This is nonsense: no reasonable person doubts that Congress has the
power to punish tax evaders (and mail thieves and patent infringers and so
forth). That authority is implicit, either as incident to Congress’s taxing
power or as part of the authority specified by the Necessary and Proper
Clause. To be sure, a close reader of Section 8 would notice the express speci-
fication of a power to punish counterfeiters and the absence of any parallel
power to punish tax evaders. But the inference that Congress lacks those
other powers of punishment is based on a false premise: that the existence of
Clause 6 is a necessary condition for Congress’s having the power to punish
counterfeiters. Even if there were no Clause 6, Congress would have the
power to punish counterfeiters, just as Congress has the power to punish tax
evaders. 69 Yes, this line of reasoning means that Clause 6 is superfluous, and
many constitutional interpreters resist the idea that the Constitution con-
tains surplusage. 70 But it does, just as most documents drafted by large
66. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
68. Id . cl. 6.
69. As St. George Tucker casually observed, the Punish Counterfeiters Clause “seems to
be a natural incident to” the Borrowing and Coining Money Clauses. 1 BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
app. at 262–64 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Small 1803).
70. Some prominent constitutional interpreters insist on going badly wrong in exactly
this way. See, e .g ., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 550 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588–89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(complaining that current understanding of the Commerce Clause renders “superfluous” the
Article I, Section 8 clauses permitting Congress to “enact bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money
and fix the standard of weights and measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States
coin and securities, cl. 6. . . [or] establish post offices and post roads, cl. 7, or to grant patents
and copyrights, cl. 8”).
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committees do. Section 8 may be a competently drafted collection of clauses,
but it is not a finely wrought work of art. 71 Nor, a fortiori, is the full set of the
forty-three constitutional clauses scattered throughout the Constitution con-
ferring power on Congress, only eighteen of which are in Section 8.
In short: some clauses enumerating congressional powers specify powers
(in this example, to criminalize counterfeiting) that Congress would have
even if those powers were not enumerated. It is thus not the case that the
enumeration’s failure to include a given power means that any particular au-
thority is denied. This is true even where the power not enumerated is com-
parable to, and comparably important with, a power that the Constitution
does bother to enumerate. And once it is clear that the enumeration of cer-
tain powers does not reliably imply the absence of similar powers not enu-
merated, it is hard to sustain the idea that the limits of congressional power
can be inferred by thinking about what the enumeration of powers seems to
leave out. 72
3. The Extratextualism of “Necessary and Proper”
On one possible framing, the foregoing problem with inferring the ab-
sence of congressional powers from silences in the Constitution’s power-
conferring clauses arises from the Necessary and Proper Clause. That clause
makes it impossible to construe the boundaries of the full set of congression-
al powers without recourse to extratextual considerations. Even if all of Con-
gress’s other powers had clear internal limits—a heroic assumption, given
the many interpretive questions that might arise about those other powers—
the Necessary and Proper Clause would mean that no analysis of congres-
sional power could fix the limit of what Congress can do based on the texts
of the power-conferring clauses alone, without the need for substantive
judgment about the propriety of congressional action. After all, the Neces-
71. See Schwartz, Limits of Enumerationism, supra note 4, at 611 (“The enumeration
was not carefully drafted to list all its powers at a similar level of generality and importance.”).
72. One might wonder whether maintaining the idea that the enumeration limits con-
gressional power has expressive value even if it lacks practical value. In other words, maybe it is
worth continuing to say that the enumeration limits congressional power even if it doesn’t re-
ally do so. Maybe speaking as if the enumeration were limiting reminds us of a general com-
mitment to federalism, or to a sense of fidelity to the Founders, or to subsequent constitutional
tradition—even if the enumeration in reality plays no important role in federalism and was not
designed by the Founders to do so. See Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (2016) (pursuing the possibility that the idea of a limiting enumeration is valuable
mostly as symbolism). As with many conjectures about expressive value, this one is hard to
judge. We cannot preclude the possibility that continuing to speak of a limiting enumeration
has salutary effects on American approaches to federalism and constitutional fidelity. But we
also cannot preclude the possibility that continuing to speak of a limiting enumeration (also?)
has a different set of less salutary effects. Perhaps constitutional lawyers’ insisting that the Con-
stitution’s enumeration of congressional powers is limiting even though it is not causes people
to think of federalism doctrine, or constitutional law more generally, as a forum in which peo-
ple say things that make no sense. We see no realistic way of comparing the magnitudes of
these expressive effects.
May 2021] Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers 1449
sary and Proper Clause means that any conclusion that some action lies be-
yond Congress’s ken requires a judgment that that action is not necessary
and proper. And judgments about necessity and propriety are substantive. 73
Some writers have been tempted by the thought that modern deci-
sionmakers can avoid making substantive judgments about necessity and
propriety by reading the Necessary and Proper Clause to embody a set of
eighteenth-century understandings. The idea is that a jurisprudence of orig-
inal meanings would allow them to implement the judgments that the
Founders built into the Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than having to
make judgments of their own. 74 But any attempt to define the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause by reference to original meanings must cope
with the fact that from the very beginning, Americans with different sub-
stantive views about national power made different judgments about what
the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized. 75 For reasons one of us has ex-
plained at length, a choice to interpret the Clause in accordance with the
views of some members of the Founding generation rather than others
would be irreducibly normative. 76 One could make such a choice, but then
one’s own choices, not the Founding generation’s, would define the scope of
congressional power. In short, the phrase “necessary and proper” will not
mechanically draw a boundary between the zone of congressional power and
the zone of regulation reserved exclusively to state legislatures—not even if
one reads that phrase as the Founding generation read it.
The situation with the Tenth Amendment is similar. Its text suggests the
existence of spheres of decisionmaking where Congress should not inter-
vene. But like the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Tenth Amendment does
not identify any particular sphere as falling within that category. It neither
names nor even suggests criteria for identifying the fields of regulation that
(either conclusively or presumptively) should be handled by local deci-
sionmakers. Those fields are instead defined by reference to whatever powers
have not been delegated to the United States. So when the scope of Con-
gress’s sixty-plus powers turns out to be pretty broad, the residuum becomes
73. See John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of
Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 53–57 (2014) (laying out the textual case for
treating the Necessary and Proper Clause as a delegation of policymaking authority rather than
as a specification of a legal limit).
74. See, e .g ., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993); GARY LAWSON,
GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010).
75. See, e .g ., JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 213 (2018) (describing the First Congress’s debate over
the bill to incorporate the Bank of the United States).
76. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Strategic Ambiguity and Article VII’s Two-Stage Ratifica-
tion Process: Why the Framers (Should Have) Decided Not to Decide (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. L. &
Econ. Rsch. Paper, Working Paper No. 19-43, 2019), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454955
[https://perma.cc/J6Q7-BVX6].
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vanishingly small, and the Tenth Amendment’s text offers no resources for
identifying where it is important to push back.
The impracticality of deriving robust limits on Congress’s powers from
the limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause is well illustrated by the newest
commandeering decision, Murphy v . NCAA. 77 Unlike earlier Supreme Court
opinions forthrightly acknowledging that the anticommandeering doctrines
do not simply follow from the content of the enumerated powers, 78 Justice
Alito’s opinion in Murphy tried to justify the anticommandeering principle
strictly in terms of the internal limits of Congress’s enumerated powers. Ac-
cording to the Murphy Court, the reason why commandeering is unconstitu-
tional is neither more nor less than this: Congress is authorized to do only
those things described in its enumerated powers, and nothing in the enu-
merated powers authorizes Congress to commandeer state officials. 79
This internal-limits presentation of a doctrine whose real grounding lies
in external limits is more than a little unsatisfying. It is of course true that the
Constitution enumerates no congressional power to commandeer state deci-
sionmakers. But neither does the Constitution enumerate a power to charter
corporations or ration the cultivation of wheat. Those other powers are im-
plied by the Necessary and Proper Clause as reasonable ways of executing
projects valid under other congressional powers. Chartering a corporation
(say, the United States Postal Service) might be a reasonable step toward exe-
cuting Congress’s postal power, and rationing the cultivation of wheat might
be a reasonable way to regulate national and international commerce in
grain. Why, then, is the power to commandeer state officials not also a rea-
sonable way to carry out Congress’s acknowledged powers? For example, the
law in Printz directed state officials to help regulate retail sales of a consumer
good usually shipped in interstate commerce. 80 Why isn’t such a law neces-
sary and proper for the regulation of commerce? Nothing in Murphy ex-
plains the Court’s skepticism about inferring a commandeering power with
the same ease as, say, a corporation-chartering power. A high court can an-
nounce by fiat that requiring state officials to implement federal statutes is
not “proper.” But such a judgment is not justified by the meaning of the
word “proper.” It rests on considerations that lie outside Article I’s text—
considerations that Murphy ignores as it seeks to derive the anticomman-
deering rule from the textual enumeration of powers.
77. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
78. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) (explaining that the anticommandeering
doctrine is an external limit that blocks certain congressional actions regardless of the content
of Congress’s enumerated powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (acknowl-
edging that the Court’s analysis of the commandeering question was rooted in sources other
than the Constitution’s text).
79. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (stating that the anticommandeering doctrine exists
simply because the power to give direct instructions to state governments is “conspicuously
absent from the list of powers given to Congress”).
80. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–04.
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4. The Limits of Purpose-Based Reasoning
When constitutional text alone cannot deliver, interpreters sometimes
wisely read that text in light of broader constitutional purposes. In this vein,
some theorists have thought that if we can determine the purpose for which
the Constitution enumerates congressional powers, we can also establish the
content, and therefore the limits, of the textually conferred powers more
clearly. 81 But this strategy faces a basic obstacle: limiting federal power might
not be the predominant purpose of Article I’s enumeration. Deriving some
sort of limit on Congress from the spirit of that enumeration, therefore, is
like making soup from a rusty nail in the folk tale—an act of self-deception
in which the “nail” (i.e., the overall purpose of Article I) adds nothing but a
pretext for supplying ingredients having nothing much to do with the text’s
apparent purpose. 82
By way of illustration, consider Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel’s im-
portant argument that the purpose of Article I’s enumeration of congres-
sional powers is to enable Congress to solve collective action problems
among the states. 83 Cooter and Siegel would use that account of Article I’s
purpose to resolve ambiguities in constitutional text, justifying federal regu-
lation where such collective action problems exist while barring federal law
elsewhere. 84 But even if this approach can succeed in explaining why the
Constitution should be read to confer certain powers on Congress, it cannot
without more explain why the Constitution should not be read to confer
other powers on Congress. That the Constitution aims to empower Congress
to solve collective action problems provides no reason to restrict congres-
sional power to such scenarios. Maybe Congress should be understood to
have the power to solve collective action problems and also to act in some
other situations.
Cooter and Siegel accordingly argue for a background principle by
which there should be no national regulation except where the collective-
action rationale recommends it. Their “internalization principle,” which re-
sembles the European idea of “subsidiarity,” 85 holds that all governmental
power should presumptively be exercised by the smallest possible political
unit, because “local residents possess better information than nonresidents”
and “have stronger incentives than nonresidents to monitor the officials re-
81. See, e .g ., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010).
82. The folk tale of “nail soup” comes in many forms, but we rely on the Swedish ver-
sion: a beggar offers to make a soup from a boiled nail, a challenge that so excites the neighbors
that, just to add flavor and not as the main ingredient, each brings a vegetable or seasoning to
add to the alleged nail stock, resulting in a flavorful and nutritious soup that has nothing much
to do with the nail. See Nail Soup, THORPE LEA PRIMARY SCH., https://www.thorpe-
lea.surrey.sch.uk/nail-soup [https://perma.cc/2HFW-7FPT].
83. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 81.
84. Id . at 144.
85. Id . at 181 n.238.
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sponsible for creating and maintaining [local public goods].” 86 The internal-
ization principle is thus less an inference from the text of the Constitution
than an attempt to give rational content to a photographic negative of the
idea that Congress is empowered to solve collective action problems. The
thought process runs like this: the Constitution seeks to empower Congress
to solve collective action problems; therefore, the Constitution does not em-
power Congress to act in other scenarios; therefore, some principle unites
those other scenarios.
It is difficult, however, to derive Cooter and Siegel’s “internalization
principle” from Article I’s actual enumeration. As they recognize, Article I,
Section 8 reflects the shortcomings rather than the virtues of decentraliza-
tion. 87 Article I is accordingly not useful for inferring when the deference
ordinarily required by the Necessary and Proper Clause should be suspend-
ed. Such an inference requires some concept of national collective action
problems—that is, of ways in which Congress is liable to fail to aggregate cit-
izens’ preferences fairly. From the beginning of the Republic, prominent
constitutional theorists offered up such theories of congressional failure,
pointing to (for instance) the collective action problems confronted by a het-
erogenous, continental-scale population in monitoring and controlling their
elected representatives. 88 Whatever one might think of such theories’ rele-
vance to constitutional meaning, one cannot derive such theories from the
spirit or purpose of Article I, simply because Article I was directed at an en-
tirely different—indeed, opposite—problem.
To justify constitutional limits on Congress, one needs a theory explain-
ing when and to what extent Congress has perverse incentives to overcen-
tralize, as well as a theory of how the answers to that question map on to
scenarios where local decisionmaking is especially subject to pathologies of
its own. 89 Just as the answers to those questions will not emerge from the
specific texts of the Constitution’s clauses vesting power in Congress, they
will not emerge from an account of the purpose for which the Constitution
as a whole confers power on Congress. After all, the answers to these ques-
tions are not about the purpose for which Congress holds power. They are
about the typical pathologies of national decisionmaking relative to the pa-
86. Id . at 137–38.
87. See id . at 147–50.
88. See, e .g ., James Madison, Consolidation, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 1791, at 42, reprint-
ed in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 6 APRIL 1791–16 MARCH 1793, at 137 (Robert A.
Rutland & Thomas A. Mason eds., 1983) (arguing that large scale of continental democracy
would defeat voters’ ability to control Congress or Congress’s ability to assess voters’ senti-
ments, thereby empowering executive); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The
Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859 (2021) (making an analo-
gous argument for a disadvantage of the federal government compared to the states in repre-
senting majority opinion).
89. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 207, 210–11 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell
eds., 2010).
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thologies of local decisionmaking. To map that terrain, we need tools that lie
outside not only the text but also outside the purpose of Article I’s enumera-
tion.
5. This Enumeration of Powers Is No Way to Limit a Legislature
The constitutions of some federal systems respond to this problem with
a straightforward solution. Rather than leaving the domains of subnational
decisionmakers to be inferred as the things omitted from a list of enumerat-
ed national powers, they affirmatively specify the topics that should be (con-
clusively or presumptively) reserved to subnational decisionmakers. For
example, the Canadian Constitution expressly specifies that the provincial
governments presumptively enjoy the power to legislate on matters includ-
ing education, 90 property, 91 and the provinces’ own civil services. 92
These affirmative specifications do not eliminate all uncertainty about
the legislative jurisdictions of the national and local legislatures in Canada.
The powers specified as belonging to each legislature must still be interpret-
ed, and sometimes a piece of regulation might seem to come within grant of
power to both the national and a subnational government. 93 But the written
constitution does supply a basis for identifying the local legislatures as the
preferred bodies for certain kinds of regulation. So when national power
makes law in one of these spaces, albeit in the apparent exercise of some au-
thority granted to the national legislature, there is a basis in constitutional
text for asking whether national power is being read too broadly.
Why doesn’t the United States Constitution use the same strategy? In
part, the Framers assumed a relatively small federal footprint, 94 so as a gen-
eral matter they did not invest much effort in affirmatively marking the do-
main of the states. (The qualifier “as a general matter” is important. In the
matter of slavery, where some delegates at the Convention were particularly
invested in protecting local decisionmaking, the Constitution was written
with affirmative limits on Congress, such as the Nonimportation and Export
Clauses of Article I, Section 9. 95) As it happens, the federal footprint has ex-
panded, in ways enabled by the enumerated powers even if not foreseen by
90. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 93 (U.K.).
91. Id . § 92(13).
92. Id . § 92(4).
93. Compare Fowler v. R., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213, with R. v. Crown Zellerbach Can. Ltd.,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (illustrating ambiguity of power to prevent interprovincial water pollution
created by article 92’s grant of power over “fisheries” to provinces and article 91’s grant of
powers for “peace, order, and good government” to federal government).
94. In 1801, at the beginning of the Jefferson Administration, the federal government
employed only around 150 persons beyond members of Congress, the president, and the vice
president. BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 112 (2009).
95. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1986).
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the Founders. The Constitution’s failure to specify an area of presumptive
subnational authority has accordingly left us in a situation where the text
provides few resources for identifying external limits.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that this phenomenon is solely
the result of a vast and unforeseen expansion of federal governance unfold-
ing over many generations. It is also a function of the Constitution’s having
been written predominantly for the purpose of empowering the national
government rather than limiting it. 96 Obviously, constitutional law must do
both of those things. But the Framers went to Philadelphia to solve the prob-
lem of insufficient central power, so it should not be surprising that the doc-
ument they drafted concentrates on the measures that would solve that
problem—that is, on conferring rather than limiting national power. To the
extent that Article I, Section 8 sounds in federalism, therefore, it makes sense
to think of it as having been crafted much more for the purpose of empower-
ing the national government than for the purpose of limiting it.
To many constitutional lawyers, the qualifier “to the extent that Article
I, Section 8 sounds in federalism” might seem unnecessary. What was Sec-
tion 8 written to do, a normal intuition runs, if not to distinguish the zone of
national power from that of state power? But that intuition misses something
important about Section 8, which is that Section 8 sounds not just in federal-
ism but also in the separation of federal powers. Section 8 lists powers not of
the national government as an undifferentiated entity but of Congress. Along
one dimension, that means Congress rather than the states. But along anoth-
er dimension—and a pretty important dimension at that—it means Con-
gress rather than the president or the judiciary. To the extent that Section 8
was drawn to address the separation of national powers, it might not be a
helpful guide on questions of federalism at all.
This aspect of Section 8 is easy to see not just because the content of Sec-
tion 8 has done work in important separation-of-powers controversies 97 but
also by reading Section 8 against the background of two important texts in
whose shadow the Philadelphia Convention worked. The first was the Arti-
cles of Confederation, which contained its own enumeration of powers dele-
gated to Congress. A fair amount of Article I, Section 8 echoes Article IX of
the Articles of Confederation, which empowered the Congress to borrow
money on the credit of the United States, to regulate trade with Indian tribes,
to coin money and regulate its value, to fix standards for weights and
measures, to establish post offices, to declare war, to grant letters of marque
and reprisal, to make rules concerning captures on land and on water, to
provide for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, to
build and equip a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces. 98 It seems reasonable to assume that the Consti-
96. Richard Primus, The Elephant Problem, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 373, 374–76
(2019) (describing the Framers’ priority as empowering the national government).
97. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952).
98. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
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tution’s drafters had the Articles handy when they did their work, and it is
also easy to understand why the Constitution’s drafters might have thought
it important to repeat the express mention of powers explicitly specified in
the Articles of Confederation. First, omitting specific mention of such pow-
ers might invite the inference that a power conferred by the Articles was not
conferred by the Constitution. Second, even if future interpreters of the
Constitution correctly concluded that those powers were meant to be vested
in the national government even though not specifically mentioned, they
might then divide on the question of where in the national government those
powers were lodged. Under the Articles, all powers vested in the United
States were held by a single institution: the United States in Congress assem-
bled. But under the Constitution, “Congress” became just one of three
branches of government—and it could not automatically be assumed that
the powers held by the United States in Congress assembled under the Arti-
cles would be powers of Congress in the new three-branch system. Some of
the powers that the Articles had given to the United States in Congress as-
sembled—like the power to send and receive ambassadors and the power to
direct military operations—would under the Constitution be allocated to the
president. 99 To omit express instructions about who in the new government
could exercise which powers specifically mentioned in the Articles would
therefore beg some obvious questions. The express allocation of powers
enumerated in the Articles—whether to Congress or to another institution—
may have seemed like an easy solution to that problem. And to the extent
that Section 8 was a solution to that problem, it was the solution to a prob-
lem sounding in the separation of powers rather than in federalism.
The second piece of context heightens the importance of separation-of-
powers questions to the composition of Section 8. In his canonical Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone provided a list of powers
that belonged to the King, rather than Parliament, under the British consti-
tution. That list included the powers to regulate commerce, naturalize aliens,
coin money, regulate weights and measures, establish courts, declare war,
issues letters of marque and reprisal, and raise and regulate armies and na-
vies. 100 Several of those powers were expressly given to the United States un-
der the Articles of Confederation. Other powers that Blackstone described as
belonging to the King, like the power to naturalize aliens and the power to
create (nonadmiralty) courts, were not delegated to the United States under
the Articles but would presumably (or at least plausibly) exist somewhere in
the government that the Constitution created. And unless the Constitution
specified otherwise, Blackstone’s association of those powers with the King
would have grounded an argument for treating them as vested in the presi-
dent. Those powers, the intuition would run, are powers appropriate for a
government’s chief executive officer, as Blackstone’s presentation indicat-
99. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
100. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242–70.
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ed. 101 So if the Framers wanted those powers to be exercised by Congress ra-
ther than the president, they would be well advised to say so expressly. And
they did. 102
Situating Article I, Section 8 against these two basic pieces of back-
ground should emphasize problems with treating that Section as if it reflect-
ed, as an integrated whole, the Framers’ views about what sorts of powers
states should be able to exercise without national interference. A fair amount
of Section 8 might exist simply because particular powers appeared on pre-
vious lists—lists that were not written to instantiate anything like the federal
arrangements envisioned by the Framers. One of those lists (from the Arti-
cles of Confederation) reflected a federal system that the Framers were re-
jecting, and the other (Blackstone’s) was not about federalism at all. Seen in
that light, trying to use Section 8 as a guide to the limits of national legisla-
tive jurisdiction seems like a case of pressing a text into service for a purpose
that did not guide its creation. It should not be surprising if the text turns
out not to work so well for that imposed purpose.
We wish to be clear about the limits of our present claim. We do not
know exactly how the principal drafters or the Constitutional Convention as
a whole thought about the origins or purposes of Article I, Section 8. As far
as we can tell, nobody does. 103 The surviving historical records that might
answer the question are spotty and often unreliable, and we have attempted
no painstaking construction of the drafting history. Maybe the drafters, con-
sciously expecting interpreters to read their work against the Articles and
Blackstone, expressly allocated many specific powers to Congress so as to
avoid unwanted but foreseeable inferences that those powers were lodged
elsewhere. Or maybe in some more inchoate way the earlier lists made cer-
tain powers salient, and the drafters mentioned them mostly because they
were, from experience, powers of the kind that get mentioned in documents
like these. One way or another, it is hard to read the Articles of Confedera-
tion and Blackstone’s list of Crown powers without thinking that Section 8
101. That does not necessarily mean that the powers in question would have been re-
garded as “executive powers.” In the British constitution, and in the conceptions of many of
the Founders, not every power exercised by the “executive branch” of government was by na-
ture an “executive power.” See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power,
Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169 (2019). What matters for present purpos-
es, though, is that regardless of whether the powers on Blackstone’s list were deemed “execu-
tive” or something else (like “prerogative” or “federative” or even “legislative”), they were
powers properly held by the King, and that the closest analog to the King under the Constitu-
tion was the president.
102. By W.W. Crosskey’s reckoning almost seventy years ago, Article I, Section 8 con-
tains thirteen powers that Blackstone described as belonging to the Crown in the British sys-
tem. 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 412–13 (1953). See also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO
WOULD NOT BE KING: EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 74 (2020) (reaffirming
this account).
103. Though some people have done admirably illuminating work trying to figure it out.
See, e .g ., William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2012).
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was drafted in their shadow. And to whatever extent dynamics like these
drove the drafting of Section 8, that Section was crafted with attention to
something other than the question of what powers should be exercised by
states rather than by the new national government. Indeed, to whatever ex-
tent Section 8 was crafted to prevent future decisionmakers from taking
Blackstone as a guide to presidential power, it was not crafted as a technolo-
gy of federalism at all. It was crafted with the assumption that things left off
the list might belong to the president.
To be sure, some important parts of Section 8 are there as a result of the
Convention’s deliberate judgment about what powers should be exercised
centrally in the reconstituted federal system, not (or not only) because of a
concern about the division of power between the president and Congress.
The power to tax and the power to regulate commerce are two important ex-
amples: letting the general government wield those powers was a central part
of the Convention’s project. 104 And in a few respects, Section 8 is indeed
naturally read as drafted for the purpose of limiting national power. The re-
quirement that duties, imposts, and excises be uniform throughout the Unit-
ed States is an example, 105 as is the proviso that Congress can secure exclu-
exclusive rights in writings and discoveries only “for limited [t]imes.” 106
Even those limitations, however, might not reflect the idea that some sorts of
regulation should be done locally rather than nationally. (Congressional
copyrights and patents are not time-limited so that state governments can
issue permanent copyrights and patents;107 congressional appropriations for
armies are not limited to two years so that state governments can make mili-
tary appropriations for the longer term.108) To the extent that Section 8 is
about federalism rather than the separation of national powers, it seems to
have been written with primary attention to the functions of the national
government rather than those of the states. Identifying the sorts of deci-
sionmaking that are better done locally was not the activity in which the
drafters of Section 8 were engaged. So it should not be surprising that their
work product is not a good guide for answering that question.
C. Conclusion: Toward External Limits
In light of all of the problems with using the Constitution’s clauses enu-
merating congressional powers as a guide to identifying a boundary between
state and national legislative domains, one might simply give up the attempt.
Perhaps we should reconcile ourselves to a system in which Congress can
104. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 9 APRIL 1786–24 MAY 1787, at 345 (Robert A. Rutland &
William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975) (identifying the general government’s lack of these powers
under the Articles of Confederation as serious problems in need of remedy).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
106. Id . cl. 8.
107. Id .
108. Id . cl. 12.
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regulate where it pleases and state law governs in those spaces where Con-
gress tolerates it. Accepting that world would not mean giving up federalism.
For a variety of reasons, many of them matters of structure and process,
states are likely to be important decisionmakers on a host of issues as far into
the future as one could possibly see. But the enumeration of Congress’s pow-
ers seems to play little if any practical role in maintaining the federal system.
We think that constitutional decisionmakers should give up the attempt
to allocate power between Congress and the states by reference to the Consti-
tution’s enumeration of congressional powers. But we do not think that con-
stitutional decisionmakers should give up the attempt to allocate power
between Congress and the states. Instead, constitutional law should ap-
proach questions about that allocation with better tools. To use a set of cate-
gories introduced earlier, some of those tools should be external limits, not
internal ones. That is, they should be affirmative specifications of kinds of
legislation that Congress should not enact, or at least kinds of legislation that
Congress should not enact lightly.
II. THE POSSIBILITY OF SUSPECT SPHERES
External limits on federal power are nothing new. Unlike the suspect
spheres that we urge, however, most prior schemes of external limits on fed-
eral power marked categorical limits that Congress was flatly prohibited
from overstepping. Consider, for example, the statement in United States v .
Butler that Congress could not regulate agriculture, 109 or the attempt to pre-
vent the commerce power from reaching “labor” and “manufacturing.” 110
Such limits reflected an attitude of “dual federalism,” 111 in which judicially
enforced constitutional doctrines “divide up the world into spheres of state
and federal primacy.” 112
We agree with (and have contributed to) the scholarship pronouncing
dual federalism unworkable. 113 The project of having courts police categori-
109. 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
110. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (describing the authority to regu-
late labor as “a purely state authority”); id . at 273–74 (stating that granting Congress power
over interstate commerce does not “give it authority to control the States in their exercise of
the police power over local trade and manufacture”).
111. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
112. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemp-
tion in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 335 [hereinafter Young, “The Ordinary Diet
of the Law”]. Professor Young has regularly attacked the idea of spheres of state primacy in a
string of thoughtful articles and book chapters. See, e .g ., Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persis-
tence of Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY: NOMOS LV 34, 65 (James E.
Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) (describing the “line-drawing problems” raised by efforts
to define separate state spheres).
113. See Neil S. Siegel, Distinguishing the “Truly National” from the “Truly Local”: Cus-
tomary Allocation, Commercial Activity, and Collective Action, 62 DUKE L.J. 797, 808–13
(2012); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Comment: Slipping the Bonds of
Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 114 (2014); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
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cal boundaries among regulatory domains like “commerce” and “labor” and
“manufacture” was incoherent, as was the attempt to establish a judicially
enforceable boundary between “traditional governmental functions” 114 and
other things that ordinary governments do. To put the point doctrinally, if
our idea were entirely successful, National League of Cities would remain as
dead in the future as it is today.
In this Part, we offer a way of thinking about certain kinds of policymak-
ing not as exclusively reserved to the states but as suspect when engaged in at
the national level. We begin, in Section II.A, by explaining the value of trying
to construct such suspect spheres. Our focus is the possibility that well-
chosen limits on national policymaking could reduce the stakes of national
politics. At a time when polarization in national politics threatens to con-
vulse every part of the constitutional system, devices for lowering the tem-
perature are well worth considering.
In Section II.B, we ask readers to imagine suspect spheres as partly anal-
ogous to constitutional doctrine in the realms of due process and equal pro-
tection, where courts take harder looks at governmental action deemed
“suspect.” Due process doctrine, for instance, requires governments to justify
displacing parents’ judgment about what serves the best interests of their
children because the sphere of child-rearing is presumptively controlled by
parents. This does not mean that governments do not regularly displace pa-
rental judgments about children’s welfare. It just means that, when they do
so, courts will demand more and better reasons. By analogy, a suspect-
sphere approach to federalism would demand that Congress be especially
plain and provide stronger reasons when regulating in areas where local de-
cisionmaking is presumptively preferable. The intuition animating this ap-
proach is that local and national decisionmaking processes are vulnerable to
different (if overlapping) sorts of pathologies. Where national legislation is
likely to be more vulnerable to pathology, national legislation is to that ex-
tent suspect. But “suspect” is not the same as “forbidden.” And we stress that
the analogy is only partial: the role we imagine for courts is weaker for feder-
alism’s suspect spheres than it is in the realm of individual rights.
In Section II.C, we differentiate our approach from some famously un-
workable attempts to enforce federalism through external limits at earlier
times in history. As noted above, we have no intention of reviving National
League of Cities, nor the more general idea of dual federalism, and our ap-
proach does not imagine the existence of static domains appropriate for local
control (like “agriculture” 115 or “family law” 116). Nor do we treat state law as
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96
MICH. L. REV. 813, 818–19 (1998).
114. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
115. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936).
116. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (identifying family law as a sphere
inappropriate for congressional regulation).
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normal and federal law as an exception to be contained. Instead, our ap-
proach sees both Congress and the state legislatures as normal decisionmak-
ing institutions, each with tendencies toward pathological decisionmaking
and neither inherently more trustworthy than the other. 117 And crucially,
though our conception seeks to raise the cost that Congress must pay to
make policy in suspect spheres, it need not suggest a warrant for the judici-
ary to stop Congress from going places where Congress is determined to go.
Finally, in Section II.D, we address the method by which constitutional
decisionmakers could identify federalism’s suspect spheres. That identifica-
tion would be a matter of constitutional construction rather than of textual
interpretation. 118 Decisionmaking engaging in that construction would rea-
son from history, structure, and ideas traditionally held within the American
constitutional system. We freely acknowledge that the constructive reason-
ing we envision will not offer determinate right answers. There will be disa-
greements, and decisions will require the exercise of judgment. We see no
way of reasoning about federalism that avoids those challenges.
A. Why Bother? Decentralization as Temperature Control
In times of highly polarized politics, federalism might have special value
in mitigating partisan rancor. By allowing people in different regions of a
country to adopt different policies on issues where there is intense but rea-
sonable disagreement, federal regimes reduce the stakes of national poli-
tics. 119 Indeed, they do so in more than one way. First, assuming some
correspondence between local public opinion and local law, they permit
many people who would be unhappy with controversial policy decisions
made nationally to live under rules that they prefer. Second, the subnational
jurisdictions could sustain a party out of political power at the national level
by demonstrating the feasibility or even desirability of its program. 120 On
this account, federal regimes operate as political insurance policies. In return
for reducing each party’s capacity to advance all of its policy priorities na-
tionwide when it is the party in power at the national level, decentralization
protects each party against maximum loss when it is the party out of power.
The costs of losing any particular round of national elections are reduced.
And each party then has less incentive to treat every aspect of national poli-
tics as a fight to the death. 121
117. See Hills, supra note 89, at 207, 210–11.
118. On the distinction between construction and interpretation in constitutional law,
see, for example, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
119. Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958 (2014).
120. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1132 (2014).
121. This benefit of decentralization does not rely on a false picture of subnational juris-
dictions as ideologically homogenous. They are not. Red states have Blue spots—college towns
or big cities with substantial nonwhite populations—and Blue states have rural areas whose
voters do not share the worldviews of the Big City pols or the college-town liberals. But that
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It is not hard to see why federal regimes offering this benefit can be po-
litically fragile. The party in power must have some credible assurance that
its forbearance will be reciprocated when the wheel of fortune turns and the
party in power and party out of power trade places. Such credible commit-
ment could be difficult to provide. A party currently out of power might
promise to exercise self-restraint in the future in return for the party in pow-
er’s self-restraint in the present, but such promises are difficult to enforce.
The failure of an incumbent president or congressional majority to exploit
its moment of power might accordingly seem more like the concession of a
chump than like mature self-restraint. And incumbent parties in power face
considerable pressure from their electoral bases to make the most of law-
making power while they hold it.
This problem is especially intense where political parties are highly po-
larized and ideologically programmatic. In a system of nonprogrammatic
parties, members of different parties have overlapping ideologies that give
legislators incentives to delegate policymaking to subnational institutions,
thereby ducking controversial decisions that might alienate substantial
numbers of their own party. 122 Recall here how New Deal Democrats dele-
gated the administration of social welfare programs to state and local offi-
cials in an effort to assure the party’s Southern wing that national officials
would leave issues of race and gender to local control. 123 Likewise, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s turning insurance regulation over to the states in
1945 has proven durable in part because insurers and state insurance com-
missioners are not programmatically supported by one party and opposed by
the other. 124 By contrast, where national parties are tightly unified by rival
and nonoverlapping ideologies, the party in power has more incentive to
impose its will on the party out of power at the subnational level. Elections at
the subnational level, in effect, become second-order elections on national
issues, with state and local legislators running on the record of the national
parties—abortion, immigration, war in Afghanistan—rather than on their
performance regulating their particular jurisdictions. 125 Where rank-and-file
party members are impatient for comprehensive policy change, party leaders
who supported federalism when their party was out of power predictably
heterogeneity does not cancel the capacity of decentralization to lower the national tempera-
ture. Indeed, state-level heterogeneity is in important respects a feature rather than a bug be-
cause it reduces the degree to which the states will be ideological echo chambers exacerbating
polarization at the national level.
122. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic The-
ory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990).
123. SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL
PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1998).
124. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945:
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 20–40 (1993).
125. David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 807–09 (2017).
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abandon such after winning a national election. 126 In short, it is hard for the
rival parties to reach the sort of federalist settlement that protects each side
from total defeat, even though the system overall might be well served if fed-
eralism could play that role.
We acknowledge and largely share the post-Garcia view that courts are
poorly suited for policing the boundaries of federalism. But the difficulty
that parties in and out of power face in making credible commitments to
each other points to an important corollary: the fact that courts are problem-
atic facilitators of federalism does not mean that Congress is optimally
equipped for the job, either. So a sophisticated understanding of each insti-
tution’s strengths and weaknesses might be consistent with a limited judicial
role in this project. Temperature-reducing federalism is something from
which everyone benefits, but it is difficult to achieve without a little constitu-
tional help. A few judicial speed bumps—for instance, plain-statement rules
requiring Congress to be especially clear when drafting statutes that gratui-
tously nationalize issues with high cultural or partisan salience—can help
each party in Congress achieve temperature-reducing insurance that they
both want but cannot easily achieve unaided. 127 In this sense, the judiciary in
a suspect-spheres model provides Congress with something more like a
helping hand than an oppositional constraint. 128
Again, we do not imagine external limits that place any specific domains
of policymaking completely off limits to Congress: our system has been
down that road before. But we do imagine an approach that would raise the
costs of the national government’s preempting subnational policy within
suspect spheres. To whatever degree it succeeded, such an arrangement
would give each political party some basis for confidence that its self-
restraint when it is the party in power would be reciprocated when it is the
party out of power.
Critical to this idea of using external limits to ground a modus vivendi
between the party out of power and the party in power is that the limits cho-
sen actually provide benefits on both sides of the partisan aisle. A theory of
suspect spheres that allowed federal law to preempt policies favored in Blue
126. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 493–
500 (2016).
127. A judicial refusal to give a statute a particular effect unless the requirement of that
effect is plainly stated in the statute raises the cost to the legislature of securing that effect by
forcing the legislature (really, its majority coalition) to reach agreement on more points than
would be necessary absent a clear-statement rule.
128. For expositions of various models of judicial review that explain judicial constraints
on the legislature as aids in stabilizing coalitions by removing divisive issues from the legisla-
tive agenda, see Howard Gillman, Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 644 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen &
Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Politi-
cal Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 583 (2005); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns  .  .  .”: The Political Foun-
dations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2003); Mark A. Graber, The Non-
majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993).
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States (say, medical-marijuana laws) but not policies favored in Red States
(for instance, open- or concealed-carry laws) would have little traction as a
bipartisan truce. The motivation for the party in power to accede to limits on
its power is that it will benefit from those same limits when it becomes the
party out of power, so only a system of external limits promising bipartisan
benefits can serve the desired purpose. The concept of “suspect spheres”
must accordingly be general enough to provide benefits to both parties.
B. Suspect National Legislation: A Partial Analogy to Substantive Due Process
The idea that some congressional legislation could be categorized as fall-
ing into “suspect spheres” on federalism grounds relies on a rough analogy
to constitutional doctrine in the realms of due process and equal protection,
where courts take harder looks at governmental action deemed “suspect.” In
all these contexts, background principles of electoral accountability suggest a
default principle of significant judicial deference to legislative decisionmak-
ing. In cases involving the Necessary and Proper Clause as well as cases in-
volving equal protection and due process, that default is generally called
rational basis review.
In the due process and equal protection contexts, that deference is offi-
cially reduced when courts examine governmental decisions that raise suspi-
cions about pathologies in the relevant decisionmaking processes (like racial
prejudice) or especially onerous burdens (for instance, on private liberties
deemed “fundamental”).129 Formally, analysis under the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not use different tiers of scrutiny in this manner. But judicial
doctrine, in practice, plainly raises the level of scrutiny in particular contexts
without much explanation, sometimes by pegging the degree of suspicion to
the particular enumerated power being executed (the “congruence and pro-
portionality” standard in cases arising under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment being an easy example). 130 As Aziz Huq has argued, this ap-
proach to degrees of suspicion does not make much sense. 131 It does not fol-
low, however, that tiers of scrutiny pegged to factors unconnected to Article
I powers are equally senseless. Indeed, a system of varying tiers of scrutiny
for federal legislation is a de facto part of current federalism doctrine, inas-
much as the courts give narrow readings to federal statutes deemed to “upset
the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” 132
Gregory v . Ashcroft illustrates that this “usual balance,” whatever it
might be, is not defined by Article I. In reading the Age Discrimination in
129. The canonical citation is United States v . Carolene Products Co ., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
130. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20, 533 (1997) (establishing the con-
gruence and proportionality standard).
131. Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 575, 626–55 (2013) (describing inconsistency in deference to Congress based on particu-
lar powers exercised by Congress).
132. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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Employment Act (ADEA) 133 narrowly in order to uphold Missouri’s manda-
tory retirement age for state judges, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion
admitted that the statutory language did not naturally lend itself to the nar-
row reading that she chose. 134 Because the literal reading of the ADEA was
deemed to “interfere[] with this decision of the people of Missouri, defining
their constitutional officers,” 135 the Gregory majority held that the ADEA
should not be read to cover judges unless that coverage would “be plain to
anyone reading the Act.” 136 Article I says nothing whatsoever about whether
Congress can interfere with state definitions of its constitutional officers.
Gregory’s principle that congressional legislation of that sort is to be narrow-
ly construed is, in effect, a statement that such legislation falls into a suspect
sphere, and that sphere is grounded in considerations independent of the
Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers.
The Court’s jurisprudence suggests that such suspect-sphere analysis
can guide the judiciary’s approach to federal regulations of private persons as
well as state officials. Consider Bond v . United States. 137 The defendant in
Bond tried to inflict a skin rash on her husband’s lover with an arsenic-based
compound. 138 Though far from the sort of atrocity the drafters of interna-
tional chemical weapons conventions typically contemplate, that conduct
straightforwardly satisfied the prohibition on “chemical weapons” described
in the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, which
prohibits any knowing “use” of any “toxic chemical,” except as specified by
the statute. 139 The Supreme Court nonetheless vacated her conviction, rely-
ing on Gregory v . Ashcroft’s principle that statutes ought to be read against
“the background principle that Congress does not normally intrude upon the
police power of the States.” 140
The Court in Gregory and Bond did not merely apply a canon of con-
struction that counsels narrow readings of federal statutes whose meaning is
otherwise in equipoise. It put a robust thumb on the scale against federal law
over some range of topics. 141 Indeed, given the statutory text at issue in each
case, and the degree to which each decision seems determined to resist the
ordinary meaning of that text, the metaphor of the thumb might be too mea-
ger: Gregory and Bond seem more like several fingers, if not an entire fist.
133. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).
134. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467 (recognizing this language as “an odd way for Congress to
exclude judges”).
135. Id . at 460.
136. Id . at 467 (emphasis added).
137. 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
138. Bond . 572 U.S. at 852.
139. 18 U.S.C. §§ 229, 229F(1).
140. Bond, 572 U.S. at 863.
141. On the distinction between antipreemption canons and clear-statement rules, see
Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law,” supra note 112, at 271–72.
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But in each case, it is plausible to think that Congress might not have wanted
the outcome that a less federalism-conscious construction of the statute
would have supported, so it is not unreasonable to think that the Court’s re-
sistance to federalization in those cases would give way if Congress came
back with a pellucid indication of an intention to federalize. In sum, the
Court’s construction of the statutes in Gregory and Bond tempered the reach
of federal law without denying Congress’s authority to make policy if Con-
gress really wants to do so in the future.
Reasonable people can differ about whether Gregory and Bond were
rightly decided. But regardless of the merits of those two particular deci-
sions, “plain-statement rules” of the kind the Court deployed in those cases
show how heightened scrutiny can limit power without walling topics cate-
gorically out of Congress’s jurisdiction. In the presence of a serious federal-
ism concern, the judiciary can interpret statutes somewhat obstructively. But
the qualifier “somewhat” is important. Congress remains able to make poli-
cy, even in these precise areas, if it proffers a suitably strong justification or
manifests its intention with sufficient clarity.
In this sense, the Gregory-Bond canon has a function analogous to the
triggers for heightened scrutiny under the doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess. Consider, by analogy, the doctrine that state laws regulating parental
decisions regarding the education and care of children should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. 142 Nothing in this doctrine forecloses extensive state
regulation of parenting decisions. State law indeed regulates everything from
vaccination to school attendance without offending the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 143 Nevertheless, state decisions that second-guess parenting decisions
without reason are subject to searching judicial examination that other types
of state law do not receive. 144 There is no due process category of “parenting”
that is off-limits to the law, but state laws that regulate parental decisionmak-
ing are in a suspect sphere where legislation requires more justification than
142. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases).
143. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 35 (1905) (holding that a mandatory
vaccination statute was a valid exercise of the state’s police power); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (noting that the state may impose reasonable regulations for the control
and duration of a child’s education).
144. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a par-
ent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to
this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). That said, state laws serving im-
portant child-welfare interests often satisfy this heightened scrutiny. See Noa Ben-Asher, The
Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 382–94 (2012). For an analysis of Troxel v . Gran-
ville as protecting the custodial parent’s rights to deference from state actors for her decisions
directed in good faith at the best interests of her child, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitu-
tional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 197–203 (2003).
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usual and legislatures receive less than ordinary deference. 145 Suspect spheres
in federalism works the same way in decisions like Gregory and Bond.
Clear-statement rules of the kind used in Gregory and Bond are not the
only devices by which courts might raise the costs of federal lawmaking in
suspect spheres. Depending on the context, courts might reduce the defer-
ence they show to the legal interpretations, 146 factual findings, 147 or guidance
documents 148 issued by federal agencies. Whatever form reduced judicial
deference takes, however, it is important that suspicion not be fatal and that
Congress have the last word, so long as its determinations are backed by suf-
ficiently plausible reasons. The suspect spheres defined by the Gregory-Bond
canon are thus weaker than the due process and equal protection limits,
which require some sort of weighty interest to justify intrusions into parental
authority. If a court holds a statute invalid on the grounds that it violates due
process or equal protection, Congress cannot overcome the court’s judgment
simply by saying, “Actually, we really want to do that.” 149 By contrast, the
suspect-sphere external limits suggested by the Gregory-Bond canon are soft.
The courts are putting up resistance, but they are not policing static and in-
violable boundaries.
C. Suspect Spheres Versus Dual Federalism
The “soft” nature of external limits within a suspect-sphere approach is
one way that the suspect-spheres model would not reproduce the well-
known problems of the system called “dual federalism.” To repeat, dual fed-
eralism is the theory that state and federal governments should swim in their
own lanes, regulating distinct, nonoverlapping topics separated by a rigid
constitutional barrier. 150 That image of American federalism has rightly been
criticized as both descriptively fanciful and conceptually unworkable. 151 The
conceptual problem is that it makes little sense to imagine that categorical
terms like “education,” “criminal law,” “family law,” “commerce,” and “taxa-
tion” define mutually exclusive regulatory realms that can be allocated sepa-
rately to state or federal control. The social world does not come in separate
packages corresponding to categories like these. Attempts to carve the social
145. The suspect-spheres apparatus for federalism is more analogous to heightened scru-
tiny in the due process context than in the context of equal protection because heightened re-
view in the equal protection context is more frequently fatal in fact. Due process doctrine, by
contrast, often treats government action impinging on “intimate association” or “family au-
tonomy” more as a trigger for reason-giving than as a ground for presumptive prohibition. We
are indebted to Kenji Yoshino for this observation.
146. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
147. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
148. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
149. Not in the United States, anyway. See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 33 (U.K.).
150. See Corwin, supra note 111.
151. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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world into such categories with legal rules predictably invite lawyerly efforts
to manipulate the labels in ways that win cases without making substantive
regulatory sense. 152 The descriptive problem is essentially a manifestation of
the conceptual problem: dual federalism imagines a world in which state and
federal governments pursue separate goals with distinct resources—in
Gerken’s phrase, “engaged in the governance equivalent of parallel play” 153—
but the actual world looks nothing like that. In reality, state and federal offi-
cials “govern shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space,” 154 cooperat-
ing or fighting with each other, in each of many shared policy domains, to
accomplish overlapping purposes. This intertwining of federal and state gov-
ernance is longstanding, pervasive, and ordinary.
Our suspect-sphere approach avoids these problems. It does not imagine
that the areas where federal policy should not lightly displace state policy
correspond to static categories like “education” and “family law.” Instead, it
seeks to identify reasons why local control is sometimes preferable and then
to put a thumb (or a few fingers) on the local side of the scale when those
reasons apply. Unlike the dual-federalism model, the suspect-spheres model
embraces the reality of mixed federal and state governance in regulatory
sphere after regulatory sphere. 155 It identifies areas where federal policy
should not lightly displace state policy, but it never imagines substantive pol-
icy realms in which Congress simply may not act.
Others have worried, not unreasonably, that trying to differentiate be-
tween policy areas where federalization is and is not suspect is hopeless. In
Ernest Young’s formulation, the attempt to defend federalism by treating
congressional action more skeptically in some regulatory fields than in oth-
ers “reintroduces the same confusion that led to the demise of dual federal-
ism in the first place.” 156 To avoid that problem, Young urges courts to adopt
a general presumption against preemption—that is, a skeptical posture to-
ward any federal law that conflicts with state law. That solution would in-
deed prevent courts from having to make contestable judgment calls, and as
such it has an undeniable appeal. But it also has significant weaknesses. For
one thing, if Young were right that courts should abandon all hope of differ-
entiating among fields of regulation substantively, it is not clear why the so-
lution should be a wall-to-wall presumption against preemption rather than
a wall-to-wall presumption in favor of preemption. That too would eliminate
the need for sorting, and it might be more consistent with the Constitution’s
central purpose of enabling national legislation. 157 Moreover, as Young can-
152. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
153. Gerken, supra note 113, at 87.
154. Id . at 114.
155. See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966) (describing “marble cake” federalism).
156. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law,” supra note 112, at 332.
157. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 234–40 (2000), has defended a lim-
ited form of such a presumption based on the wording of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI,
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didly acknowledges, the Supreme Court has never endorsed such an indis-
criminate speed bump to all federal preemption. 158 Instead, it has found
preemption more readily in commercial transactions, admiralty, and bank-
ing than in criminal law, family law, tort law, and land use law. 159
Just as it does not make sense to treat all laws as equally suspect under
the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not make sense to treat with equal sus-
picion all federal legislation that displaces any state law. The better course of
action in either case is to tailor presumptions to the relevant risks. Used well,
suspect spheres can do in federalism cases an important part of the work that
heightened scrutiny does in individual rights cases: increase the burden of
justification for types of law that have a greater risk of proceeding from
pathological reasons or imposing indefensible burdens. And if the courts
avoid treating policy fields as statically divided between governments, and
similarly avoid the idea that they have the ultimate authority to police that
division, a suspect-spheres approach will not reproduce the problems that
make dual federalism nonviable.
D. Suspect Spheres as Constitutional Construction
The next hard question, of course, is how constitutional decisionmakers
could identify the suspect spheres. In what instances, exactly, should Con-
gress be reluctant to legislate, and courts be willing to blunt and delay na-
tional action, in order to deliver the decentralization that might moderate
the stakes of national politics? The text of the Constitution will not answer
that question. Instead, the shape of the suspect spheres must be a matter of
constitutional construction, 160 one that draws upon sources from within
what scholars sometimes call the “small-c constitution.” 161 Those sources in-
clude historical experience for two reasons. First, experience furnishes useful
knowledge—indeed, knowledge not available to the Founders—about how
American federalism actually works. Second, patterns of historical practice
can legitimize constitutional arrangements with the venerability bestowed by
the reference of which to federal supremacy “notwithstanding” state law suggests a blanket
waiver of protecting state law with the canon against implied repeal.
158. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”, supra note 112, at 337.
159. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Preemption Doctrine in the Roberts Court: Constitutional
Dual Federalism by Another Name?, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 195, 223–26 (Jona-
than H. Adler ed., 2016).
160. For an overview of constitutional construction, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 118.
161. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082
(2013); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1459–60 (2001); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 111–26
(2001); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
43–45 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1890).
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time, both with and without the assistance of formal precedential deci-
sionmaking, judicial or otherwise. 162
We are keenly aware of the many ways in which “looking to history” for
constitutional authority can go wrong. Many attempts to ground constitu-
tional law in historical experience are shallow, peremptory, or downright fic-
tional. Even good accounts of history are regularly challengeable with other
good accounts. Put generally, “history” is not a force that directs determinate
constitutional principles; it is a source of raw material that can be used to
support constitutional arguments. 163 But to make a point just a little polemi-
cally, the same could be said about the text of the written Constitution, or at
least about most of the clauses of the written Constitution that are at issue in
cases that make their way to court. The potential for drawing multiple and
conflicting inferences from the historical record is, accordingly, not a suffi-
cient reason to abandon history as a source of constitutional authority. It is
simply a reason to try to use the resource intelligently, with due attention to
what it is being used to show in any given instance and whether it can in fact
show that thing. And sometimes, historical information is rather useful for
sound constitutional decisionmaking. For example, historical knowledge
sometimes suggests a popular consensus about constitutional meaning, 164 a
political settlement that courts ought to accept for the sake of stability, 165 or a
natural experiment showing the practical consequences of a political system. 166
Our arguments about federalism and history are intended to demon-
strate the potential for establishing criteria that can help decisionmakers
identify areas of regulation where federal lawmaking should be treated with
some suspicion. We investigate that potential in part by noticing themes in
the past behavior and historical intuitions of American decisionmakers try-
ing to make federalism work. We do not claim that ours is the only possible
way of reading the historical record, and we do not claim that facts about
history compel our recommendations for constitutional law. We hope to
show, however, that a suspect-spheres approach would not be a radical break
with American constitutionalism as practiced to this point. On the contrary,
it would have thematic antecedents in the constitutional past. In sum, it
would be a strategy consistent with insights that can be gleaned from one re-
sponsible reading of American constitutional history—both the history of
how federalism has actually operated and the history of various attempts,
more and less successful, to make it work.
162. On how “reverence for the laws” is fortified when the “examples which fortify opin-
ion are ancient as well as numerous,” see THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, NO. 49, at 315 (James
Madison).
163. Balkin, supra note 15, at 661–63, 665–72.
164. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019).
165. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
166. Balkin, supra note 15, at 665–68.
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III. ILLUSTRATION: THE CORPORATE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The external limits that we propose must meet a set of demanding
standards. They must pick out types of federal law as presumptively suspect
without preventing intermingled federal and state policymaking. They must
find some support in American constitutional practice, both to suggest their
functionality and to help establish their legitimacy as a tool of constitutional
reasoning. And they must support a bipartisan truce aimed at lowering the
stakes of national political conflict, one that politicians on both sides would
favor but cannot achieve without some mechanism for credible constitution-
al commitment.
One might reasonably ask whether such a doctrine is practically possi-
ble. In what follows, we seek to illustrate the possibility of a soft-limit, sus-
pect-sphere approach with a case study drawn from the United States’s
constitutional traditions regarding delegations of governmental power to
private corporations. After considering this attempt, readers can draw their
own conclusions about the viability of such an approach.
The potential suspect sphere we describe is animated by a principle that
we call the corporate nondelegation doctrine. The essence of that doctrine is
suspicion toward federal laws that delegate broad immunities or powers to
private corporations. In this Part, we illustrate this principle’s deep constitu-
tional history. It played an important role in James Madison’s attack on the
First Bank of the United States, in Andrew Jackson’s attack on the Second
Bank, and in the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act (NIRA) of 1934. As that set of examples suggests, the corporate
nondelegation doctrine functioned both as a legal conception animating ju-
dicial action (as with NIRA) and as a principle of constitutional politics (as
with Madison and Jackson). At the end of this Part, we will be in a position
to notice some ways in which the corporate nondelegation doctrine helps
make sense of modern federalism cases.
The idea that delegations of power to private corporations are especially
suspect was a dominant theme of antebellum American constitutional law.167
But it had no foundation in the Constitution’s text, whether in the enumera-
tion of congressional powers or anywhere else. The text of the Constitution
is silent about Congress’s power to confer powers on corporations. That si-
lence is not an accident. At the Convention, the delegates considered enu-
merating a specific power to charter corporations but decided against it,
167. Some scholars have identified the constitutional debates over corporate power with
a worry that broad congressional powers to aid corporations in making internal improvements
would imply a congressional power to regulate or forbid slavery. See, e .g ., David S. Schwartz,
An Error and an Evil: The Strange History of Implied Commerce Powers, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 927,
959–63 (2019). We agree that a desire to protect slavery was an important motive for opposi-
tion to federal aid for internal improvements. But as the narrative that follows indicates, we
think that the slavery-protective interest was not the only source of opposition to such exercis-
es of federal power. The idea that delegations to private corporations were especially suspect
survived slavery’s demise and was held by constitutional commentators who were opposed to
slavery.
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largely because they worried that such an express power would provoke op-
position during the ratifying process. 168 (The delegates did not think that
their declining to enumerate such a power would prevent Congress from
chartering corporations; they just thought it would make the issue less sali-
ent.) Then, in the state conventions, some prominent Anti-Federalists tried
and failed to attach amendments prohibiting federal aid to corporations. 169
So the adopted constitutional text remained silent on the issue, with each
side’s having failed to make that text conform to its preferences.
Subsequently, politicians opposed to federal aid to corporations often
made their arguments in constitutional terms. Those arguments were some-
times presented as if they flowed from the text of Article I’s enumeration of
congressional powers. 170 But in truth, the argument against the constitution-
ality of aid to corporations did not turn on any specific constitutional text. It
turned on the idea that there were special risks to allowing large private cor-
porations to manipulate Congress. In other words, the principle that these
politicians argued for is best understood as an external limit on Congress—a
prohibition arising from a reason Congress should not act—and not an inter-
nal limit resulting from anything about the scope of the enumerated powers.
168. James Madison, then a supporter of an expansive view of the national government’s
powers, had proposed on September 14th that Article I of the Constitution include a clause “to
grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U. S. might require & the legislative
provisions of individual States may be incompetent.” 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 615–16. Rufus King, the Massachusetts ally of Alexan-
der Hamilton, was sympathetic to the idea as a matter of principle, but he argued that the poli-
tics of ratification counseled against such clarity: “The States will be prejudiced and divided
into parties by [an express power to charter corporations],” King noted, reminding the Con-
vention of the controversies over the Bank of North America by observing that “[i]n
Philad[elphia] & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of a Bank, which has been a
subject of contention in those Cities.” Id .
169. For a list of the various amendments urged by Anti-Federalists to limit congression-
al power to aid corporations, see Recommendatory Amendments from State Conventions, CTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF THE AM. CONST., https://csac.history.wisc.edu/document-collections
/constitutional-debates/debate-about-amendments/recommendatory-amendments-from-
state-conventions [https://perma.cc/DH56-J6Z6]. In the New York ratifying convention,
Melancton Smith urged an amendment providing “that nothing in the . . . Constitution . . . shall
be construed to authorize Congress to grant monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive
advantages of commerce.” Melancton Smith, Proposed Amendments at the New York Ratify-
ing Convention (July 2, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON SMITH
CIRCLE 328, 328–29 (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb eds., 2009). Smith withdrew the
amendment and voted for the unamended Constitution when he was informed that “condi-
tional approval” of the Constitution subject to ratification of such amendments was not an op-
tion. See Robin Brooks, Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and the Ratification of the
Constitution in New York, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 339, 354–56 (1967).
170. For a list of the techniques that constitutional interpreters have used to create the
illusion that their interpretation of Congress’s implied powers somehow follows from the
enumeration in Article I, see Schwartz, Limits of Enumerationism, supra note 4, at 621–24.
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A. Madison and the First Bank
Consider Madison’s 1791 stand against the bill to charter the Bank of the
United States as an example of an argument rooted in historical sources ex-
ternal to the text of Article I. Madison’s argument enlisted a new canon root-
ed in an extratextual consideration—a presumption that federal laws
conferring benefits on private corporations were especially suspect as inci-
dental means for executing enumerated powers. According to Madison, the
proposed power to charter a bank was not a necessary and proper means be-
cause it was “a great and important power” rather than an incidental one. 171
The measure of its “importance” was rooted in Madison’s extratextual as-
sessment that such a bank charter threatened citizen equality and democratic
equality by enriching and empowering a set of already-wealthy stockhold-
ers, 172 committing the government to deal only with a single corporation, 173
and inviting the corruption of officeholders and the undue influence of the
financial class.
Madison’s conclusion that bank charters fell within a suspect sphere of
federal powers rested on two points critical for understanding how suspect
spheres work. First, Madison rooted the canon entirely in considerations of
constitutional purpose external to the text of the enumeration. Second, Mad-
ison derived these external considerations from Anglo-American culture and
history rather than from the text of the Constitution.
Consider, first, how Madison’s suspicion of congressionally conferred
corporate charters rests on reasoning external to anything in Article I. As
Jonathan Gienapp has powerfully argued, Madison’s argument contained
several important interpretative innovations. 174 One such innovation, re-
cently highlighted by William Baude, is the presumption against inferring
that Congress’s incidental powers included any “important” powers, on the
ground that a reasonable drafter would not leave important matters to impli-
cation. 175 That “important” powers might be excluded from the scope of in-
cidental powers was a plausible claim. But the “importance” of any claimed
171. See James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791),
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480, 487 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
172. As Madison put it, the charter’s giving a single corporation the power to hold federal
revenues “involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen.” Id . at 488.
173. Again, quoting Madison’s speech in the House, the twenty-year term of the Bank’s
charter “takes from our successors, who have equal rights with ourselves, . . . an opportunity of
exercising that right, for an immoderate term.” Id . at 487.
174. GIENAPP, supra note 75, at 287–324.
175. “In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree of its inci-
dentality to an express authority is to be regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since
on this will depend the probability or improbability of its being left to construction.” William
Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1751 (2013) (quot-
ing LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 39, 40
(M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832)). On Baude’s revival
of interest in this canon, see id . For a detailed critique of the concept of a “great” implied pow-
er, see Schwartz, Limits of Enumerationism, supra note 4, at 612–17.
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incidental power had nothing to do with inferences from constitutional text.
Instead, Madison inferred that chartering corporations was an “important”
power because it posed risks to important extratextual values like political
equality. 176 Put more generally, although it makes sense to presume that
“important” matters should not be lightly inferred as “necessary and proper”
for the execution of expressly enumerated powers, one cannot derive the list
of “important” powers not specified in the Constitution from reading the
text of Article I, and Madison did not try.
How, then, did Madison support his inference that the power to charter
a bank was an “important” power? He relied on cultural considerations ex-
ternal to the text of Article I, resonating with an Anglo-American tradition
of suspicion toward corporate power already of long standing in 1791. A
generation before Madison was born, it was powerfully manifested in the
pamphlet attacks on the corruption of the British government by the South
Sea Company in the 1720s. 177 At least one set of those pamphlets—Cato’s
Letters, by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon 178—was widely read in the
American colonies and helped make the denunciation of corporate fi-
nance—“stock-jobbing,” in 18th century jargon 179—a prominent theme of
eighteenth-century American political discourse. 180 These tropes were sta-
ples of American polemics against the British government after 1773, when
Parliament enacted the Tea Act to bail out the East India Company. Like the
South Sea Company, the East India Company had loaned millions of pounds
to the government and in return secured major economic concessions—
including a monopoly on the right to sell tea in North America. 181 And as
was to become important in the Bank debate, Madison and other leading
Americans had come to think that the tendency to be corrupted by financial
176. See Madison, supra note 171, at 490.
177. For an examination of this controversy, see LEWIS MELVILLE, THE SOUTH SEA
BUBBLE (1921). For a more specific discussion of the pamphlets, see id . at 140–41.
178. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS, OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY,
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS (Ronald Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund
1995) (6th ed. 1755).
179. On denunciations of stock-jobbing’s corrupting influence, see, for example, Letter
No. 6 (Dec. 10, 1720), in 1 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 178, at 55, 55–56, addressing
“[h]ow easily the People are bubbled by Deceivers” (“Common sense could have told them,
that credit is the most uncertain and most fluctuating thing in the world, especially when it is
applied to stock-jobbing.”).
180. On the influence of Cato’s Letters in North America, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35–36 (enlarged ed. 1992).
181. H.V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND IMPERIAL
BRITAIN, 1756–1833, at 30–33 (2006); see also BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE PATRIOTS,
17–21, 163 (2010) (discussing the role of opposition to corporate monopolies to the ideology of
the American Revolution); Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Uprising Against the East India
Company, 32 POL. SCI. Q. 60, 73 (1917) (noting “the fear of monopoly was the mainspring of
American opposition”).
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insiders was not equal in all governments. The centralized governments of
large empires were especially vulnerable. 182
Madison’s characterization of a congressional power to create and pat-
ronize “an incorporated monopoly bank” 183 as particularly dangerous, and
therefore as not to be read as implied in the Constitution, drew on this deep
well of rhetoric and ideology. It was that tradition, rather than the text of Ar-
ticle I or any implicit purpose of subsidiarity embedded in that text, that al-
lowed Madison to distinguish the Bank of the United States from postal
monopolies 184 and other less frightening fruits of Congress’s early legisla-
tion. And for former Anti-Federalists, Madison’s embrace of suspicion to-
wards private corporations with special connections to the government was
common sense. Throughout the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists had
urged that continental-scale legislatures like the proposed Congress were at
risk of being captured by financiers, merchants, and other elites—“natural
aristocrats,” in their phrase—dominant in Eastern Seaboard cities. 185 Behind
this fear of capture lay the reality that urban elites enjoyed organizational
advantages that would matter in politics. Communication among merchants,
lawyers, and financiers across a continent was facilitated by networks created
by trade, universities, and newspapers, most of which were controlled by
Federalists. 186 If national politics became a competition to influence the allo-
cation of wealth, farmers in the hinterland who enjoyed none of those organ-
izational assets would be at a severe disadvantage. 187
182. JOHN DICKINSON, A NEW ESSAY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF GREAT-
BRITAIN OVER THE COLONIES IN AMERICA 21 (Philadelphia, J. Almon 1774) (“The attention of
small states extends much more efficaciously and beneficially to every part of the territories,
than that of the administration of a vast empire.”).
183. Madison, supra note 171, at 480, 486.
184. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, NO. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (“The power of
establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and may, perhaps, by judi-
cious management, become productive of great public conveniency.”); cf . Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 6, 1796) in 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 223, 226
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (failing to convince Madison that that Congress’s power to cre-
ate post roads may be a “source of boundless patronage to the executive, jobbing to members
of Congress & their friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money”).
185. See Saul Cornell, Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism,
76 J. AM. HIST. 1148 (1990); see also James H. Hutson, Country, Court, and Constitution: Anti-
federalism and the Historians, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 337, 338 (1981); JACKSON TURNER MAIN,
POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION 358, 388 (1973) (noting that Anti-Federalists
tended to be “agrarian-localist” rather than “commercial cosmopolitan” leaders).
186. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION,
1787–1788, at 74 (2010) (noting that only twelve out of over ninety newspapers published any-
thing in opposition to the proposed constitution).
187. As one Anti-Federalist put it, the “mercantile interests” in the seaport could focus
their lobbying “where they please,” while “the landed interest” were “scattered far and wide”
and “have but little intercourse and connection with each other” such that “carrying elections
of this kind”—that is, elections that transcend the jurisdiction in which the farmer’s real estate
was located—“is intirely [sic] out of their way.” Letter of “Cornelius”, HAMPSHIRE CHRON., Dec.
11 & 18, 1787, reprinted in SAMUEL BANNISTER HARDING, THE CONTEST OVER THE
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Madison himself was a recent convert to the Anti-Federalists’ way of
looking at this aspect of political mobilization in geographically large poli-
ties. In 1787, in Federalist 10, Madison had famously praised the great extent
of the United States as a positive feature that would prevent factional legisla-
tion. 188 He changed his mind within four years. 189 In his 1791 essay “Consol-
idation,” Madison warned that the diversity of interests in the “extended Re-
Republic” that he formerly praised as a solution to the problem of faction
might instead lead to paralysis in Congress, because “neither the voice nor
the sense of ten or twenty millions of people, spread through so many lati-
tudes as are comprehended within the United States, could ever be com-
bined or called into effect.” 190 Rather than a healthy legislature that could
break and control the violence of faction, the result might be an ineffective
legislature and a corresponding rise of the policymaking power of the execu-
tive branch. When Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury succeeded in get-
ting Congress to charter the Bank and then used open-market operations to
manage credit, Madison and others of like mind saw a realization of Anti-
Federalist fears that the federal government’s scale made it prone to capture
by financiers.
One might argue that Madison’s reliance on a traditional hostility to-
ward aid for corporations sounds in partisan politics rather than constitu-
tional construction. That would be too quick. Madison explicitly framed his
argument in substantively constitutional concerns: he formally distinguished
between his “remarks on the merits of the bill” and his argument against “the
authority of Congress to pass it,” 191 thus making the standard constitutional
advocate’s move of saying, “This is a bad bill, but apart from that, it’s uncon-
stitutional, so you must oppose it even if you like its policy.” Moreover,
Madison and his allies presented their opposition to the Bank as flowing
from—indeed, required by—the Republic’s fundamental nature. To recog-
nize a congressional power to charter the Bank, Madison warned, would
transgress the Constitution’s “essential characteristic” as the plan of a limited
government. 192 In other words, Madison was making an argument about
both the structure of American government and its ethos—and arguments
about the structure and ethos of American government are, in an important
RATIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS app. A at
123 (New York, Longmans, Green 1896).
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
189. For a description of Madison’s shift on this and other constitutional issues, see John
Ferejohn & Roderick Hills, Publius’s Political Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE
FEDERALIST 515, 527 (Jack N. Rakove & Colleen A. Sheehan eds., 2020).
190. Madison, supra note 88.
191. The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 20 JANUARY
1790–31 MARCH 1791, at 372, 373–74 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981).
192. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1898 (1791).
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sense, substantively constitutional arguments, whether or not they are argu-
ments about the meaning of words in the written Constitution. 193
Moreover, Madison’s framing his argument as constitutional was not
merely a rhetorical maneuver aimed at persuading his fellow congressmen to
vote against the Bank. It was made necessary by the imperatives of building a
coalition capable of protecting the fundamental interests with which he was
concerned. If citizens were to resist Hamilton and his Eastern financiers,
they would have to bridge divisions among rival interest groups, including
Madison’s own landed gentry and the growing population of the West. Mad-
ison articulated this challenge directly in “A Candid State of Parties,” a 1792
essay that again showed a marked change from the views Madison had ex-
pressed as Publius. “The anti republican party,” Madison warned, would try
to prevent the formation of a unified opposition “by reviving exploded par-
ties, and taking advantage of all prejudices, local, political, and occupational,
that may prevent or disturb a general coalition of sentiments.” 194 (A more
prosaic formulation might simply have said that the financiers might hold
on to power by buying western support with infrastructure and easy credit.)
To counteract this effort, the gentry needed to “bury[] all antecedent ques-
tions” and “banish[] every other distinction than that between enemies and
friends to republican government.” 195 Framing the case against the Bank as a
fundamental issue of constitutional principle helped. 196
That Madison characterized his argument as constitutional did not, by
itself, confer constitutional status on either his reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause or his underlying suspicion of corporate power. Congress vot-
ed against him, after all, and the Bank’s charter became law. 197 But Hamil-
ton’s victory in 1791 did not extinguish Madison’s substantive constitutional
concern. Eventually, suspicion of the national government’s involvement
with corporations and monopolies became a central component of the Demo-
cratic Party’s platform. In that form, the corporate nondelegation doctrine
shaped the dominant reading of the Constitution prior to the Civil War.
B. Jackson and Anticorporate Constitutionalism
Like Madison’s argument against the First Bank, Andrew Jackson’s ar-
gument against the Second Bank of the United States owed little to the text
of Article I, Section 8. It was instead an argument for an external limit, root-
193. See Primus, supra note 161, at 1129–34; PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
74–119 (1982) (discussing structure and ethos as modalities of constitutional argument).
194. James Madison, A Candid State of Parties, NAT’L GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 1792, at 378,
reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 6 APRIL 1791–16 MARCH 1793, supra note 88,
at 370–72.
195. Id .
196. On the role of ideology in preventing formation of majorities through distributive
politics, see Dan Alexander, Christopher R. Berry & William G. Howell, Distributive Politics
and Legislator Ideology, 78 J. POL. 214, 230 (2015).
197. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191.
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ed in the fear that federal aid to private corporations would favor privileged
insiders. And unlike Madison’s proposed limit, Jackson’s had legs: it became
the Democratic Party’s consensus position until the Civil War.
Given that Madison and his allies treated their suspicion of private cor-
porations as a matter of constitutional dimension, one might have expected
something like the corporate nondelegation doctrine to triumph once the
Democratic-Republicans became the dominant party. But matters were not
so straightforward. Once the Democratic-Republicans took control of the
national government, they seemed to abandon the principle. Confronted
with the practical problems of providing credit and infrastructure for a con-
tinental-scale nation-state, they gradually accepted not only the idea that the
national government would sponsor a private bank with monopoly privileg-
es but also the related idea that the national government should subscribe to
the stock of private canal- and road-building companies. 198 In 1816, Presi-
dent Madison signed the Second Bank of the United States into law, ambig-
uously relying on a newly minted 199 argument that Congress’s Article I,
Section 8 power to coin money authorized the Bank or, alternatively, that the
question was settled by political precedents established between 1791 and
1811. 200
But just as Representative Madison’s legislative defeat in 1791 did not
purge constitutional discourse of the corporate nondelegation idea, neither
did President Madison’s decision to set it aside in 1816. The idea persisted,
and a generation later President Andrew Jackson made it a centerpiece of the
Democratic Party’s platform and eventually the basis for the federal govern-
ment’s monetary and infrastructure policy. In those forms, the corporate
nondelegation doctrine provided a framework for federalism—one rooted in
ideology, tradition, and the structure of national politics, though not in the
text of the Constitution.
Jackson strenuously opposed federal aid to private corporations, which
he characterized as special privileges for influential insiders. By manipulating
the national government to subscribe to road- and canal-building compa-
nies, Jackson charged, financiers were using “artful expedients to shift upon
the Government the losses of unsuccessful private speculation” 201 and push-
198. RONALD E. SHAW, CANALS FOR A NATION: THE CANAL ERA IN THE UNITED STATES,
1790–1860, at 99–100 (1990).
199. Pun intended.
200. On the invention in 1815 of the argument that the Bank was necessary and proper
for carrying out Congress’s Article I, Section 8 power to coin money, see ERIC LOMAZOFF,
RECONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL BANK CONTROVERSY 111–16 (2018). Madison himself only
ambiguously endorsed this new argument, id . at 116–18, and he later relied exclusively on the
precedent-based argument. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25,
1831), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2374 [https://perma.cc
/27GZ-B6CN].
201. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding Funding of Infrastructure Development
(May 27, 1830), https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-27-1830-
veto-message-regarding-funding-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/93CW-BTLD] (vetoing the
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ing Congress to exercise “an authority unknown to the Constitution and be-
yond the supervision of our constituents.” 202 His objection to the Second
Bank was similar. The use of a single private bank as the federal govern-
ment’s fiscal agent, Jackson maintained, was a contrivance to grant special
privileges for the further enrichment of a financial insider class. Decrying
“artificial distinctions, . . . titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges” that
“make the rich richer and the potent more powerful,” Jackson argued that
the privileges conferred by the Second Bank’s charter, from owning real es-
tate and holding federal revenues to immunity from state taxes, were all too
extensive to delegate to a private corporation. 203
Some modern readers might misread Jackson here as offering a general
objection to Congress’s delegating important powers rather than exercising
those powers itself. But in fact, the problem Jackson saw was more particu-
lar. He had no objection, after all, to Congress’s delegating enormously
broad power to the legislatures of the federal territories. 204 The objection was
to a private body’s exercising delegated governmental powers. And in keep-
ing with that particular worry, Jackson specifically situated his concern with-
in the same tradition of anticorporate suspicion that animated the Anti-
Federalists. In his famously candid remarks to Nicholas Biddle, the president
of the Second Bank of the United States, Jackson explained that he had been
afraid of banks “ever since I read the history of the South Sea bubble.” 205
We do not know in what text Jackson had read about the South Sea
Bubble. But whatever it was, it was not Article I, Section 8. Jackson’s worries,
though eminently constitutional in the sense described above, were not nat-
urally expressed by anything in the Constitution’s enumeration of congres-
sional powers. They were worries about the likely pathologies of national
lawmaking, best addressed through external limits—that is, affirmative pro-
hibitions on things like granting corporate charters—rather than by negative
implication from the powers affirmatively given to Congress.
Jackson’s constitutional argument, in sum, followed exactly Madison’s
argument that chartering a private corporation like the Bank of the United
States was too “great and important” a power to be lightly inferred because
Maysville Road bill). See generally Pamela L. Baker, The Washington National Road Bill and the
Struggle to Adopt a Federal System of Internal Improvement, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 437, 456–58
(2002) (describing how Jackson “vetoed the measure on the grounds that the project was not
national in scope” but “[p]rivately . . . opposed it on constitutional grounds”).
202. Andrew Jackson, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1830),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/second-annual-message-3 [https://perma.cc
/G7WC-KZ68]. Jackson invoked this ban on federal subscriptions of private corporations’
stock to justify his pocket veto of an appropriation to purchase stock in the Louisville & Port-
land Canal Company. See 7 REG. DEB. app. at v (1831).
203. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10,
1832), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp [https://perma.cc/6U24-8V9Q].
204. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 853, 902 (1990).
205. 2 JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 599 (1911).
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such delegations were incompatible with general ideas of democratic equali-
ty implicit in the Constitution. This sort of inference owed nothing much to
any text in Article I or, for that matter, in any other article of the Constitu-
tion. 206 Instead, Jackson grounded his argument in his understanding of An-
glo-American culture and history dating back to the South Sea Bubble.
One might reasonably ask why Jackson should use this extratextual con-
cern to limit Congress’s powers in particular, rather than state and federal
governmental power more generally. Jackson’s own antipathy for financial
corporations was certainly ecumenical enough to support that expansive
form of the doctrine: as Jackson famously told Biddle, “I do not dislike your
Bank any more than all banks.” 207 Not surprisingly, Jackson indeed called for
a more total separation between government and finance, urging that state
governments’ use of private banks as fiscal agents to regulate the supply of
currency violated Article I, Section 10, which prohibits states from issuing
“bills of credit” or paper money. 208 More generally, the Democratic Party’s
“hard money” radicals urged a strict constitutional principle barring all aid
to private corporations, under the slogan “separation of bank and state[!]” 209
But that extreme position could not hold together Jackson’s political co-
alition, which was an uneasy alliance between westerners hungry for infra-
structure and credit, urban radicals suspicious of inflation and banks, and
southerners suspicious of the federal government. 210 Important Democratic
Party leaders like David Henshaw were also up-and-coming financiers who
resented the Bank of the United States’s “aristocratic” dominance but who
also did not want to push state and federal government entirely out of the
banking sector. 211 The more limited principle that the federal government
should stay away from subsidizing private banks could, by contrast, deliver
something important to both urban radicals (limiting revenue to private
206. This is not to say that Jackson made no textual arguments whatsoever. For instance,
he maintained that the Constitution’s express specification of a congressional power to confer
exclusive privileges in the copyright and patent context implied that “such a power was not
intended to be granted as a means of accomplishing any other end.” Jackson, supra note 203.
But both in the Bank context and in the context of subscriptions to companies building roads
and canals, Jackson’s reliance on Article I’s enumeration was perfunctory, while his reliance on
objections to special privileges to well-connected insiders was passionate.
207. BASSETT, supra note 205.
208. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE CIVIL WAR 349–50 (1957); U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 10. In 1837, the U.S. Supreme Court reject-
ed Jackson’s position, over Justice Story’s vigorous dissent. See Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
209. WILLIAM LEGGETT, Separation of Bank and State, PLAINDEALER, May 27, 1837, re-
printed in WILLIAM LEGGETT, DEMOCRATICK EDITORIALS: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICAL
ECONOMY 142, 145–46 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1984).
210. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN
WHO MADE IT 56–85 (Vintage Books 1973) (1948); HAMMOND, supra note 208, at 351–52;
STEPHEN MIHM, A NATION OF COUNTERFEITERS 136 (2007).
211. See DAVID HENSHAW, REMARKS UPON THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 18, 35, 42–
43 (Boston, True & Greene 1831).
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banks) as well as rising leaders like Henshaw (less competition from a federal
“monopoly”) while preserving western farmers’ access to credit.
In other words, the Jacksonian understanding of federalism was a coali-
tion-supporting compromise. This compromise eventually became the
Democratic Party’s strictly enforced constitutional dogma with the Inde-
pendent Treasury System, under which the federal government would hold
its own revenue in the form of coin stored in governmentally owned “sub-
treasuries,” on the constitutional theory that private corporations could not
be given power over public functions like control of the currency supply. 212
The antebellum Democratic Party’s anticorporate federalism, in sum, in-
tertwined constitutional principle and practical politics. Indeed, the principle
helped make the politics possible. Each constituency within the Jacksonian
coalition needed assurance that the others would accept an arrangement that
foreclosed some policies that each one favored, thus making everyone in the
coalition better off as long as everyone was willing to compromise some-
where. Without that assurance, some Democrats would have been tempted
to defect to the Whigs to pursue their top policy preferences. (Some did.) 213
By articulating the Party’s position in terms of constitutional principle, and
by rigorously ostracizing those who defied party “regularity” as traitors to
the Constitution, the party leadership was able to signal a stable commit-
ment to hold the coalition together.
The Jacksonian Democrats’ version of anticorporate federalism, like
Madison’s, owed little or nothing to the text of Article I. It was a theory of
suspect spheres, not one of enumerated powers. If the text of Congress’s
enumerated powers were the true measure of what Congress could constitu-
tionally do, it would have been child’s play to justify federal laws doing all
sorts of things to which the Democrats were constitutionally opposed. Fed-
eral power over the currency supply was obviously useful for interstate
commerce and federal borrowing. Federal charters and subsidies for rail
corporations, turnpikes, and canal companies would obviously facilitate in-
terstate commerce and the delivery of the mails. To Democrats, however,
these links to Congress’s enumerated powers were not enough to justify fed-
eral aid to corporations, because recognizing a power to confer such aid car-
ried the dangers of anti-republican corruption. The Democrats could not
and did not infer those dangers from anything in the letter or spirit of the list
of powers in Article I. That list, after all, reflects the benefits, not the dangers,
of national power. Instead, they read the Necessary and Proper Clause
212. For examples of this common argument, see CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 451
(1840) (remarks of Rep. Albert Marchand) (complaining that directors of depository banks act
“legislati[vely,] in the fullest sense of the word”); id . at 427 (remarks of Rep. Charles G. Ather-
ton) (“[W]hy ought those [banks] to be . . . entrusted with the public revenue, the possession of
which conferred political power[?]”).
213. William Cabell Rives and other Virginia Conservative Democrats, for instance, bolt-
ed the Democratic Party in 1837 over Martin Van Buren’s insistence on the Independent
Treasury System. See HENRY HARRISON SIMMS, THE RISE OF THE WHIGS IN VIRGINIA, 1824–
1840, at 118–34 (1929).
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through the lens of suspicion they constructed from popular belief and tradi-
tion.
C. Schechter Poultry and the Obvious Answer
After the Civil War, the corporate nondelegation doctrine was contested
by banks and railroads seeking to exercise delegated federal regulatory pow-
er. These banks and railroads failed in that quest: the corporate nondelega-
tion doctrine prevailed. The reasons why the corporate nondelegation
doctrine prevailed had nothing to do with the enumeration of powers in Ar-
ticle I, Section 8. Nonetheless, the repeated refusal of Congress to delegate
regulatory power to banking, railroad, and manufacturing companies creat-
ed a settled expectation of suspicion towards such delegations, one so power-
ful that the U.S. Supreme Court eventually took it to be obvious that such
delegations were constitutionally forbidden.
The Republicans who took control of the federal government after 1860
did not share the Democrats’ anticorporate constitutionalism. They did not
restore the old system of vesting monetary policy in a single, privately owned
Bank, 214 but they were perfectly willing to let Congress give direct aid to pri-
vate corporations. Federally chartered railroad companies were prominent
examples. 215 Moreover, the Republican-controlled judiciary construed the
National Bank Acts to have broad preemptive force, thus significantly ex-
panding nationally chartered banks’ immunities from state regulation. 216
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, important Re-
publican constituencies persistently lobbied for a return to Hamilton’s vision
of an economy managed by leaders of private corporations, on the theory
that only those managers had the necessary expertise. Private financiers de-
cried the incompetence of the Treasury Department 217 and called for the
money supply to be regulated instead by an association of private bankers. 218
Railroad companies complained that bureaucrats did not understand rate
214. The National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864 treated banks as purely private enterprises
pursuing private commercial purposes and delegated the control of banking policy to the
Comptroller of the Currency, a federal officer statutorily barred from holding any interest in
any private bank. See SUSAN HOFFMANN, POLITICS AND BANKING: IDEAS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 94–97 (2001).
215. Note, however, that the grants to railroads were always narrowly construed: a “plain
statement” canon limits such delegations. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of
Land, 822 F.2d 1261, 1264–65 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. 121 Acres of Land, 263 F. Supp.
737, 740 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
216. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcising McCulloch: The Conflict-Ridden History of Ameri-
can Banking Nationalism and Dodd-Frank Preemption, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1255–62 (2013).
217. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL
STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859–1877, at 265–68, 275–81, 285–93 (1990).
218. See ELMUS WICKER, THE GREAT DEBATE ON BANKING REFORM: NELSON ALDRICH
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE FED 42–51 (2005).
1482 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1431
making 219 and called for the federal government to let agreements among the
railroads themselves set the rules for “pooling” (that is, cooperation among
private lines) as well as the rates for transportation. 220 And in the wake of
their experience with cartelization by the War Industries Board during
World War I, the leaders of nationwide firms called for the relaxation of an-
titrust laws in favor of “self-government in business,” 221 by which the corpo-
rations themselves would act to prevent “destructive competition” that could
undermine high wages and product quality. 222
Given the persistence of these efforts by powerful members of the Re-
publican coalition, it is noteworthy that all these campaigns to have the fed-
eral government turn economic management over to private industry failed
spectacularly. The plan to delegate monetary policy to a bevy of private
banks was laughed out of Congress. 223 Instead, the Federal Reserve Act
placed monetary policy under a board controlled by Senate-confirmed pres-
idential appointees. 224 Rather than acceding to railroad managers’ pleas for
self-governing pools, Congress vested the power to regulate mergers and
rates in the Interstate Commerce Commission. 225 These refusals to vest fed-
eral authority in private corporations were not articulated as resting on any
constitutional prohibition. But the idea that private businesses should not be
trusted to exercise regulatory power was strong enough to command biparti-
san majorities, even in the face of the determined contrary efforts of power-
ful interest groups. In that respect, the idea functioned like a constitutional
principle, albeit not one enforced by the courts or associated with specific
words in the Constitution.
What often converts a long-accepted principle enforced by policymak-
ers’ self-restraint rather than by courts into a rule that courts will enforce as a
constitutional prohibition is the breach of that principle by some innovative
219. See, e .g ., ALBERT FINK, THE RAILROAD PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION 6–7 (New York,
Russell Brothers 1880) (arguing that rate making was “necessarily the work of experts, and not
the work of legislative departments of a government”).
220. See ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE
AMERICAN STATE, 1877–1917, at 186, 193, 197 (1999) (describing railroads’ open defense of
pooling of major lines).
221. BUTLER SHAFFER, IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE BUSINESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST
COMPETITION, 1918–1938, at 58 (1997) (quoting Our Industries Entering a New Era, 119 IRON
AGE 1523, 1524 (1927)).
222. Id . at 52 (quoting Warns the Nation to End Profiteering, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1917,
at 7).
223. RICHARD T. MCCULLEY, BANKS AND POLITICS DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: THE
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 1897–1913, at 259–62 (1992) (describing the defeat
of the Aldrich Plan).
224. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also MCCULLEY, supra note 223, at 280–81; LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 51–52 (1914) (referring to
interlocking directorates created by Morgan as “the most potent instrument of the Money
Trust”).
225. SANDERS, supra note 220, at 212–14.
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policymaker. In the case of the principle disfavoring delegations of federal
power to private corporations, the innovation-provoking judicial reaction
was part of the New Deal’s National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). That
statute, which was intended to help pull the economy out of the Great De-
pression, vested the regulation of wages, hours, working conditions, produc-
tion standards, and prices in private trade associations loosely supervised by
the president. 226
A broad coalition of stakeholders initially supported this reform. Indus-
trialists hoped to stabilize prices. 227 Trade unions hoped for the protection of
collective bargaining. 228 Anti-market intellectuals dreamed of an economy in
which the needs of consumers, labor, and industry might be balanced by ex-
pert planners. 229 Before long, however, critics characterized the NIRA as
empowering industry cartels that squeezed smaller businesses while keeping
wages stagnant and prices high. 230 Taking stock two years after the law’s pas-
sage, the nonpartisan Brookings Institution called the Act “an exercise in
counterproductivity” that “on the whole, retarded recovery.” 231 And in that
environment, the Supreme Court in A .L .A . Schechter Poultry Corp . v . United
States ruled unanimously that the NIRA unconstitutionally delegated federal
legislative power. 232
Because the president had to approve the “codes of fair competition”
that the NIRA’s trade associations formulated, the delegation of power held
unconstitutional in Schechter was formally a delegation to the president, not
a delegation to private corporations. 233 But the federal government lacked
the manpower to review the trade associations’ proposed codes, so presiden-
tial approval was perfunctory. 234 As a practical matter, the codes were pri-
226. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY
IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 31–33 (1966).
227. Id . at 36–43.
228. This protection was incorporated. Section 7(a) provided that
employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coer-
cion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection; [and] (2) that no employee and no one seek-
ing employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own
choosing.
National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 7(a), 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933).
229. HAWLEY, supra note 226, at 43–46.
230. ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933–40, at 74, 83–
88 (1989).
231. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 127
(2010).
232. 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
233. Id . at 516.
234. See BADGER, supra note 230, at 84–85.
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vately drafted regulation with the force of federal law. Indeed, the Roosevelt
Administration tried to defend the propriety of the codes precisely on the
ground that they were not governmental impositions but “rules of competi-
tion deemed fair for each industry by representative members of that indus-
try—by the persons most vitally concerned and most familiar with its
problems.” 235
The Court was having none of that. On the contrary, it regarded the idea
that private entities should engage in public regulation—long pressed by Re-
publican business interests—as completely beyond the pale:
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legisla-
tive authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower
them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabili-
tation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial
associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose be-
cause such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their
enterprises? And, could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a pref-
ace of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in [the NIRA]? The an-
swer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our
law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and du-
ties of Congress. 236
A court that asks a constitutional question and intones that “The answer
is obvious” demonstrates the highest level of confidence in its judgment—
the kind that might attend a decision striking down a law whose text began
with “This is a Bill of Attainder” or “The free exercise of religion is hereby
prohibited.” But Schechter’s nondelegation doctrine has no clear textual
home. One could read the doctrine into the Vesting Clause of Article I,
which provides that legislative powers are vested in Congress, but that read-
ing is easily contestable. As Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner have argued,
anyone who makes rules on the authority of a federal law authorizing rule-
making can be understood as acting pursuant to an exercise of legislative
power by Congress, rather than as exercising legislative powers granted to
Congress by the Constitution. 237 In the early Republic, the Constitution was
clearly read to permit Congress to authorize private entities to make public
policy: look no farther than the Bank of the United States. 238 Why then was it
“obvious” that the NIRA’s codes of fair competition were unconstitutional?
The answer lies not in the text of Article I but in political battles of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Madison had formulated, and Jackson
235. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537 (quoting Brief for the United States at 122,
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495 (No. 854)).
236. Id .
237. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1721, 1725–26, 1729 (2002). Nicholas Bagley and Julian Mortenson have recently sup-
ported Posner and Vermeule’s reading of the nondelegation doctrine with voluminous histori-
cal evidence regarding the original understanding of Article I. See Julian Davis Mortenson &
Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (2021).
238. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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had vindicated, the principle that the federal government should not give
regulatory responsibilities to private corporations. That principle held firm
during an era of another political party’s dominance after the Civil War. At-
tempts to resurrect the model of government through private business ex-
pertise were not just beaten back but repudiated in moralistic terms; the old
Jacksonian rhetoric against special privileges was refracted through Republi-
can treatise writers like Thomas Cooley, Christopher Tiedeman, and John
Dillon. 239 In the era of Schechter Poultry, that rhetoric united progressive jus-
tices like Louis Brandeis with libertarian conservative justices like James
McReynolds who rose to prominence as a government lawyer prosecuting
antitrust laws against monopolies. Like other broadly held and deeply felt
principles about the limits of government, opposition to federal delegations
of power to private corporations became entrenched as constitutional law.
And one good sign of how broadly and deeply the principle was held was, of
course, that a unanimous Supreme Court could pronounce it “obvious,” and
say that “[s]uch a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law,”
even in the absence of clear constitutional text or a line of precedential deci-
sions directing that conclusion.
As was true in Jackson’s time, one of the doctrine’s features enabling it
to be shared by such a broad coalition was its construction as a principle
about federalism rather than about government in general. At the state and
local levels, governments then and now enlist any number of private organi-
zations to administer government programs. It might be the Salvation Army
or the SPCA. If the corporate nondelegation doctrine were applied to state
and local governments, all that infrastructure would be jeopardized. State
and local governments would need either to cut back radically on their pub-
lic services or to build up robust independent bureaucracies. It is not an ac-
cident that at the federal level, the formalization of a constitutional
nondelegation doctrine coincided with the emergence of the robust adminis-
trative state, staffed by full-time public employees who could carry out poli-
cies that might otherwise have to be run through private implementers. By
restricting the nondelegation doctrine to the federal government, the Court
gave force to a broadly held view about federal power while allowing the
states to structure the interaction between public and private power in many
different ways.
One further point: our discussion of Schechter Poultry as an instance of
the corporate nondelegation doctrine at work should not be mistaken for a
recommendation that courts make that doctrine into a hard external limit to
be enforced with the power of judicial review. If it were, it might be a sickly
recommendation given how infrequently courts have struck down federal
239. On Dillon, Tiedeman, and Cooley being “Jacksonian to the core,” see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 2 (1991). On the debt owed by
conservative advocates of classical political economy to Jacksonian ideas, see HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 33–45 (1993).
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laws as invalid delegations under Schechter. 240 As explained earlier, the sus-
pect-spheres approach is a guide for nonjudicial policymakers; within the
judiciary, it is a possible source for soft limits like narrowing constructions.
Schechter, indeed, has been the basis for a nondelegation canon of statutory
construction. 241
Whatever the doctrinal merits of Schechter, our purpose here is neither
to endorse nor to criticize its holding but rather to add to the stock of exam-
ples demonstrating the work that the corporate nondelegation doctrine has
done for constitutional decisionmakers at earlier times in American history.
Schechter is especially useful for illustrating how a constitutional principle
once exclusively enforced by the political branches in party platforms and
presidential vetoes can migrate into judicially enforced doctrine, after the
course of history has made it seem “obvious.” In the next Part, we suggest
that the work it has done is not confined to earlier times.
IV. TRACES OF THE CORPORATE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IN THE
ROBERTS COURT
The corporate nondelegation doctrine illustrates how an external limit
on Congress’s powers can emerge from history and be put to use as the basis
for a constitutional truce that advances some of the benefits of federalism. In
this Part, we suggest that attention to the corporate nondelegation doctrine
can help explain and even refine some aspects of modern federalism doc-
trine. As two examples, we discuss the antipreemption canon that helps decide
cases like Altria Group, Inc . v . Good 242 and the issue of the ACA’s individual
mandate in National Federation of Independent Businesses v . Sebelius. 243
A. The Presumption Against Preemption: Altria Group v. Good
The Supreme Court in Altria Group rejected a cigarette manufacturer’s
argument that a state-law fraud claim against it was preempted by federal
law. 244 The plaintiffs in that case argued that Altria’s advertising of certain
cigarettes as “light” or “low tar” was deceptive and therefore in violation of
Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA), which prohibits deceptive
240. As Cass Sunstein quipped, the nondelegation doctrine had only one good year, and
that year was 1935. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000)
(referring to Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining).
241. On the idea that Schechter’s nondelegation principle can form the basis for a robust
canon of statutory construction, see Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646
(1980) (construing OSHA’s statutory authority narrowly because otherwise “the statute would
make such a ‘sweeping delegation of legislative power’ that it might be unconstitutional under”
Schechter Poultry (quoting Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539 (1935)).
242. 555 U.S. 70 (2008).
243. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
244. Altria Grp ., 555 U.S. at 72.
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advertising. 245 Altria—the parent company of Phillip Morris USA—pointed
to section 5(b) of the federal Cigarette Labelling Act, which provides that
“[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be im-
posed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this chapter.” 246 But according to the Supreme Court, section 5(b)
did not protect Altria because MUTPA was not a state law “based on smok-
ing and health.” 247 Its concern was truth in advertising, which is a different
thing. And although Congress clearly intended the federal regime for health-
based regulation of cigarette packaging to be exclusive, it did not follow that
Congress also intended to prevent states from imposing their generally ap-
plicable laws against fraud. 248
The Court’s analysis was contestable. In dissent, four justices argued that
because the alleged fraud was the advertising of cigarettes as less unhealthy
than they actually were, the plaintiffs’ claim was very much “based on smok-
ing and health.” 249 If the cigarettes had been manufactured in Mexico but
advertised as made in the United States, the dissenters suggested, then the
advertising would be fraudulent and an antifraud claim would not be based
on health. 250 But the essence of the plaintiffs’ actual claim was that they had
been induced to smoke in a way that was worse for their health than they be-
lieved, and Section 5(b) establishes the federal government as the sole regula-
tor of health-based interests in the area of cigarette packaging.251
How should a court adjudicate between these two possible interpreta-
tions? The majority in Altria Group answered that question by invoking a
presumption against federal preemption. Quoting Rice v . Santa Fe Elevator
Corp ., 252 a 1947 decision whose significance we will further explore below,
the majority framed its analysis as follows:
When addressing questions of express or implied pre-emption, we
begin our analysis “with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” That assumption applies with
particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occu-
pied by the States. 253
245. Id . at 72–73; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (2008).
246. Altria Grp ., 555 U.S. at 74; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965
§ 5(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
247. Altria Grp ., 555 U.S. at 87 (quoting15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
248. Id . at 84.
249. Id . at 91–93 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)).
250. See id . at 107.
251. Id . at 93.
252. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
253. Altria Grp ., 555 U.S. at 77 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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Within that framework, it is easy to reach the majority’s conclusion. Perhaps
the dissent’s view is reasonable, the logic runs. But it is not clear, let alone
“clear and manifest,” that anything in Congress’s purposes is served by pro-
hibiting states from imposing “a general rule that creates a duty not to de-
ceive.” 254 All things considered, the Rice presumption against preemption
might not have put as many fingers on the scale in Altria Group as presump-
tions against federalization put on the scale in Gregory and Bond. But the
Rice presumption does seem to do important work in Altria Group. Certain-
ly the dissenters thought it did: writing for four justices, Justice Thomas
made an attack on the Rice presumption central to the dissenting argu-
ment. 255 In Thomas’s view, no such presumption is warranted. Where the
question is express preemption, the dissent insisted, there is no reason to
slant the reading of a statute. 256 Some scholars have taken a similar view:
Caleb Nelson argues that the “notwithstanding” language of Article VI’s Su-
premacy Clause means that there can be no presumption against federal
preemption. 257
What if anything justifies the Rice canon? To explore that question, it
helps to think about the Court’s further statement that the presumption
against preemption is especially strong “when Congress has legislated in a
field traditionally occupied by the States.” 258 For reasons discussed earlier, it
is not at all straightforward to distinguish legislation in fields “traditionally
occupied by the States” from other kinds of legislation. After all, both the
states and the federal government have long made law about all sorts of
things. 259
There is, however, a different way of thinking about the “tradition” justi-
fying Altria’s antipreemption canon. At least insofar as firms assert a “frus-
tration of purpose” preemption defense, the antipreemption canon can be
understood as a corollary of the corporate nondelegation doctrine. 260 Unlike
254. Id . at 77, 84.
255. Id . at 102–03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
256. Id .
257. Nelson, supra note 157.
258. Altria Grp ., 555 U.S. at 77.
259. For a criticism of reliance on tradition to define state and federal spheres, see Siegel,
supra note 113, at 808–13.
260. Our argument about the presumption against preemption runs parallel to Craig
Konnoth’s novel and cogent argument that with federal preemption, “private corporations have
the power to preempt and otherwise displace the very state laws and programs designed to regu-
late those corporations,” effectively privatizing those regulatory standards. Craig Konnoth,
Preemption Through Privatization, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1937, 1955 (2021). Professor Konnoth’s
argument ingeniously brings together scholarship evaluating preemption, on one hand, and
privatization, on the other, by arguing that federalism and limits on preemption can address
worries about privatization. Id . (manuscript at 46) (“[By] cross-pollinat[ing] the federalism
and privatization literatures, . . . federalism itself can be used to bring privatization in check.”).
We endorse this argument in what follows, adding primarily the idea that suspicion towards
delegations of federal power to private corporations has deep historical roots in American politics.
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“impossibility preemption,” 261 frustration-of-purpose preemption defines a
“ceiling” of precautions above which the firm is free to go if it so chooses.
The usual justification is that some federal statute contains an unwritten
purpose to create a nationwide market for goods or services free from state
regulations that might be protectionist or parochial. 262 In this context, how-
ever, “market” is just a neutral-sounding word for the firm itself. In practice,
frustration-of-purpose preemption operates as a delegation of power to pri-
vate firms: those firms that meet a federal minimum standard are empow-
ered to decide whether to go beyond that federal standard, free from
interference by state policymakers. 263 Moreover, the federal delegation is not
merely a power to decide whether to exceed some federally defined mini-
mum level of care in the present. It also delegates to regulated firms consid-
erable practical power to affect whether the federal standards will be updated
over time, because understaffed federal agencies sometimes lack the person-
nel to collect and review data about adverse effects arising from the use of
the firms’ products after those products have been approved and marketed. 264
Preemption’s delegation of power to private firms naturally invites the
question of oversight. Are federal officials up to the task of monitoring those
firms to ensure that federal standards of care are not only obeyed but updat-
ed? The answer is not always encouraging. Sometimes the federal agency in
charge of overseeing firm compliance is, if not itself a fox guarding the hen-
house, nevertheless somewhat fox friendly. Federal agencies are not always
run by apolitical experts: their chiefs often serve at the pleasure of presidents
who are sympathetic to the appeals of regulated firms. Banks, pharmaceuti-
cal companies, automakers, and other firms put a lot of pressure on federal
agencies to preempt state laws simply to liberate those firms from state over-
sight, without necessarily substituting federal standards or enforcement. 265
261. See, e .g ., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009) (denying a pharmaceutical com-
pany’s preemption defense in a case where the company “failed to demonstrate that it was im-
possible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements”); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
564 U.S. 604 (2011); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
262. See, e .g ., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1386–89 (2006).
263. Sometimes the Supreme Court expressly frames frustration-of-purpose preemption
precisely in these delegation terms. See, e .g ., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873
(2000). Craig Konnoth has explicitly and accurately laid out the implicit structure of privatiza-
tion inherent in frustration-of-purpose preemption, which is a species of what he calls “con-
tractual preemption,” because private contracts replace the standards of care required by
preempted state law. See Konnoth, supra note 260 (manuscript at 17–23).
264. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–71 (“[I]t has remained a central premise of federal drug
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times.”);
David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt
Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 484–86 (2008) (describing staffing obstacles to the
FDA’s independently collecting and reviewing adverse effect data pertaining to approved drugs).
265. See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 925 (2008) (discussing federal preemption of state emission standards at behest of au-
tomakers); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Due Process Preempted: Stealth Preemption as a Consequence
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Public-interest activists can fight back, of course: citizen groups can some-
times outmobilize industry groups. 266 But if federal agencies preempt state
laws, state politicians cannot respond to citizen pressure. And Congress
might be too mired in gridlock or agenda overload to fill the oversight gap
that preemption has created. 267
The antipreemption canon can thus be understood as protection for
public interests likely to be slighted by de facto delegations to private firms
that are too loosely supervised by overtaxed federal agencies. In the form ad-
vocated by Professor Catherine Sharkey, for instance, the canon forces feder-
al agencies to expressly identify the risks regulated by preempted state law
and explain why federal law provides an effective substitute. 268 On this ac-
count, the justifications for protecting a state role in policymaking remain
robust even when the states operate in a field where Congress has undoubted
lawmaking power, because the purpose of the states is not to regulate the re-
siduum where there is allegedly no federal interest but to remedy dysfunc-
tions of the federal lawmaking process. 269 The key question in preemption
cases accordingly ought to be this one: has some pathology of federal gov-
ernance—capture by a private interest group or information overload or
gridlock—caused the scheme of federal regulation to ignore an important
policy concern that state law has addressed? And no court will arrive at that
appropriate question if it tries to reason about preemption from the text of
Congress’s enumerated powers. After all, the text of Article I, Section 8 is a
product of reasoning about what state lawmaking will not suffice for, not
about what problems might attend lawmaking at the national level. 270
In short, the text of Congress’s enumerated powers cannot explain the
antipreemption canon, but the corporate nondelegation doctrine can. If one
of Agency Capture, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 449 (2010) (describing pharmaceutical com-
panies’ pressure on the FDA to preempt state tort law through preamble to a rule lacking much
explanation or justification).
266. JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POWER OF CITIZEN GROUPS
(1999).
267. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10–16 (2007).
268. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58
DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009).
269. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE
L.J. 1889 (2014) (describing the “nationalism” of this brand of state participation in national
lawmaking processes). Craig Konnoth lays out in detail the ways in which antipreemption
principles can alleviate the problems associated with industry self-regulation under loose or
nonexistent federal oversight. Konnoth, supra note 260 (manuscript at 45–75). Professor Kon-
noth focuses less than we do on antipreemption canons, because such doctrinal fixes are inflex-
ible ways of dealing with the complex comparative advantages and disadvantages of state
governments and private firms. Id . (manuscript at 47). Accepting this criticism of doctrinal
fixes, we note that any federal statutory scheme that satisfies Professor Konnoth’s criteria for
being a “trilateral” balance of federal, state, and private power, id . (manuscript at 54–72),
would also likely satisfy the antipreemption canon defended here and, more generally, either fall
outside a suspect sphere or alleviate any suspicion that being within such a sphere would entail.
270. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 81.
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understands the states’ regulatory domain as whatever is not within the pow-
ers expressly delegated to Congress, the antipreemption canon seems sense-
less, because federal preemption cases generally arise squarely within
Congress’s enumerated commerce power. The questions concern the
preemptive force of federal statutes regulating commerce in nationally mar-
keted products like cars, pharmaceuticals, and cigarettes. 271 So it is perhaps
not surprising that the Supreme Court has never provided any coherent ex-
planation for the antipreemption canon beyond a vague respect for an unde-
fined brand of “federalism.” And in the absence of a more coherent
explanation, it is perhaps also not surprising that a plurality of the Court has
encouraged lower courts not to hesitate to find state laws preempted. 272
But once one abandons the idea that the domains appropriate for state
regulation can be identified by reasoning from what Congress’s enumerated
powers leave out, one can make headway towards justifying the antipreemp-
tion canon in terms of those interests that the federal government is likely to
neglect. Indeed, the Court already seems implicitly motivated in its preemp-
tion decisions by unspoken factors having nothing to do with Article I—for
instance, in its apparent reluctance to preempt state tort law standards. 273 In
keeping with the analysis suggested here, that reluctance might be rooted in
the fact that tort standards tend to protect interests that federal statutes often
slight or ignore, including the important interests in compensation and de-
terrence. Even when federal statutes do provide a minimum standard of care
for firms doing business in interstate commerce, they rarely provide for the
compensation of persons harmed by the violation of those standards. In con-
trast, state tort law places compensation and deterrence in the foreground.
The reality that those interests are more likely to be vindicated by state
law than by federal law ought to be part of preemption analysis. But if courts
try to assess questions about the interaction between state and federal law by
reference to the enumeration of congressional powers, those functions of
state law will be left out. The most compelling justification for the anti-
preemption canon will then remain invisible.
B. Mandatory Purchases: NFIB v. Sebelius
In National Federation of Independent Businesses v . Sebelius (NFIB), 274
five justices wrote that the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause did not give Congress the power to enact the minimum coverage
provisions—better known as the “individual mandate”—of the Affordable
271. Hills, supra note 159, at 200.
272. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 622 (2011) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (“[C]ourts
should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law.”).
273. Hills, supra note 159, at 200; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional
Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008).
274. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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Care Act (ACA). 275 The argument they presented on this point was all about
internal limits. Framed by the major premise that Congress must be limited
by its enumerated powers and the minor premise that a reading of the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses broad enough to authorize the
individual mandate could authorize any legislation not affirmatively prohib-
ited, these five justices adopted narrower readings of those clauses. 276 In par-
ticular, they endorsed the view that the commerce power permits Congress
to regulate only people who are already active in the relevant commercial
markets. 277
We think that something about the individual mandate was indeed con-
stitutionally problematic. But the five justices who adopted an activity–
inactivity distinction as an internal limit on the commerce power went badly
wrong. The constitutional difficulties that the individual mandate authenti-
cally raised had nothing to do with the supposed internal limits of the com-
merce power. They were problems of external limits. As relevant here, the
individual mandate fell within the suspect sphere defined by the corporate
nondelegation doctrine because it compelled citizens to do business with
large private corporations.
That problem would not have justified a court’s invalidating the man-
date. As noted earlier, the suspect-spheres approach generates soft external
limits rather than hard ones. But awareness that the corporate nondelegation
doctrine is part of American constitutional culture can help illuminate the
struggle over the ACA’s individual mandate, rendering what is otherwise a
bizarre argument more comprehensible. In what follows, we first discuss the
weaknesses of NFIB’s internal-limit approach. We then explain how a focus
on corporate delegation would have been more illuminating.
1. Under the Lamppost
For ease of exposition, our discussion of the internal-limit objections to
the individual mandate will focus on Chief Justice Roberts’s presentation of
the argument. Roberts’s analysis began by asking whether the mandate could
be an exercise of Congress’s power “to regulate commerce,” as specified in
Section 8. 278 According to Roberts, the mandate was not a regulation of ex-
isting commerce, because the people it coerced were not engaging in relevant
commerce at all. Instead, it was a law forcing people to engage in commerce,
thus creating commerce to be regulated. 279 And in Roberts’s interpretation
of Section 8, Congress’s power to regulate commerce cannot include a power
275. Id . at 561 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id . at 655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
276. Id . at 554 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id . at 647–48 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito,
JJ., dissenting).
277. Id . at 555 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id . at 648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
278. Id . at 550 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
279. Id . at 552.
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to create commerce. 280 So the Commerce Clause could not justify the man-
date.
Now the problem. Suppose that Roberts was right—though the point is
contestable—that the mandate required the creation of commerce where
previously there was none. Why, exactly, can a power to regulate commerce
not include the power to create it? Roberts’s principal reason was textual. If
the power to regulate includes a power to create, Roberts noted, some of the
powers enumerated in Section 8 would become superfluous. In particular,
the enumerated power to “coin Money” would be superfluous in light of the
enumerated power to “regulate the Value” of money, and the powers to
“raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy” would be
superfluous in light of the enumerated power to “Regulat[e] . . . the land and
naval Forces.” 281
That argument founders on a point explained in Part I: any plausible
reading of the Constitution’s text makes some of the enumerated powers su-
perfluous. There should be nothing shocking about that point. It is com-
pletely normal for long documents drafted by committees to have some
superfluous text. Article I, Section 8 clearly does. For example, if Section 8
did not affirmatively specify a congressional power to provide for the pun-
ishment of people who counterfeit federal securities, Congress would clearly
still have that authority, just as Congress has the power to provide for the
punishment of people who evade their taxes or steal the mail, even though
no such punishment power is expressly specified. 282 In other words, an entire
clause of Section 8—the Counterfeiters Clause—is superfluous. So the fact
that reading a power “to regulate commerce” as encompassing the power to
require commerce would make text in Section 8 superfluous is not a terribly
strong reason to preclude that reading.
Roberts next engaged the possibility that even if the Commerce Clause
did not authorize Congress to enact the individual mandate, the Necessary
and Proper Clause might. 283 The government’s theory, after all, was that
pushing more insureds into the pool would make it financially viable for the
insurance companies to cover the costs of the additional coverages they were
required to provide under the ACA. 284 Those new requirements, like cover-
ing people with preexisting conditions, were straightforwardly regulations of
entities already involved in commerce. So the mandate, which made those
requirements viable, could be understood as necessary and proper for carry-
ing the ACA’s valid commerce regulations into execution.
280. Id . at 555.
281. Id . at 550 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 5, 12–14) (“If the power to regulate the
Armed Forces or the value of money included the power to bring the subject of the regulation
into existence, the specific grant of such powers would have been unnecessary.”).
282. See supra Section I.B.
283. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 558–59 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
284. Id . at 547–48.
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In Roberts’s view, however, the Necessary and Proper Clause did not au-
thorize the mandate. 285 Roberts tried to cling tightly to the terms of Article
I’s enumeration of congressional powers in two ways. First, he repeated his
argument about the semantics of the phrase “regulate commerce,” observing
that the mandate to buy insurance would “create the necessary predicate to
the exercise of an enumerated power” rather than regulate commerce already
in existence. 286 But it is not clear why that should matter. Even if the com-
merce power standing alone does not authorize the regulation of people who
are not engaged in the relevant commerce, it does not follow that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause cannot. The limitation of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to preexisting commerce rests on the fact that
that Clause is about commerce. The Necessary and Proper Clause is not. And
surely the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to do things in
aid of its commerce legislation that Congress could not do on the basis of the
Commerce Clause alone. That’s the point of having the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause.
Accordingly, Roberts’s second argument relied on McCulloch v . Mary-
land’s suggestion that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not license the
exercise of “great substantive and independent power[s]” beyond those spe-
cifically enumerated. 287 McCulloch’s concept of “great” powers that cannot
be lightly inferred, however, is just an echo of Madison’s “great and im-
portant powers” claim. 288 As Madison understood, a prohibition on infer-
ring “great and important” powers from express powers cannot be
operationalized without some explanation of why a challenged power is
“great and important.” Madison’s explanation, as we noted in Section III.A,
rested entirely on considerations external to Article I: Madison denounced
the proposed Bank as a monopolistic threat to private equality, drawing on a
deep suspicion of governmental aid to private corporations dating back to
the South Sea Bubble. 289 In contrast, Roberts contended that “great” powers
cannot lightly be inferred but did not offer much to explain why the power
to require individuals to purchase insurance is “great.” Instead, Roberts
simply repeated his claim that Congress may not create “the necessary predi-
cate to the exercise of an enumerated power” by mandating private purchas-
es. 290 That this argument adds nothing to Roberts’s objections to grounding
the mandate in the commerce power can be seen by quoting the passage in
full:
The individual mandate . . . vests Congress with the extraordinary ability to
create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.
285. Id . at 560.
286. Id .
287. Id . at 559 (alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)).
288. See supra Section III.A.
289. See supra Section III.A.
290. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 560 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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This is in no way an authority that is ‘narrow in scope,’ Comstock, su-
pra, at 148, or ‘incidental’ to the exercise of the commerce power, McCul-
loch, supra, at 418. Rather, such a conception of the Necessary and Proper
Clause would work a substantial expansion of federal authority. No longer
would Congress be limited to regulating under the Commerce Clause those
who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of fed-
eral regulation. Instead, Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of
its authority and draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise
would be outside of it. 291
The power to require uninsured people to buy insurance, in other words, is a
too “substantial expansion of federal authority” because it is a power to re-
quire uninsured people to buy insurance. 292 Nothing in this passage goes be-
yond Roberts’s argument that the commerce power authorizes only
“regulating . . . those who by some preexisting activity bring themselves
within the sphere of federal regulation.”
One more observation is in point here. In addition to its other weak-
nesses, the internal limit on congressional power on which NFIB insisted can
contribute little to the maintenance of a healthy federal system. The action–
inaction distinction maps nothing about the different pathologies to which
national and local decisionmaking are prone. In other words, there is no
general reason to think that Congress, but not state and local governments,
will act corruptly or abusively in some way that policing the action–inaction
line would curtail. Indeed, that line probably cannot prevent Congress from
doing anything, given the ease with which “prohibited” regulations of inac-
tion can be redrafted to satisfy constitutional concerns. In NFIB itself, the
individual mandate was sustained as an exercise of a different enumerated
power: the power to lay and collect taxes. 293 Even the joint dissenters, who
maintained that the individual mandate as enacted was not justified as a tax,
agreed that Congress could impose an ACA-style mandate to buy insurance
through the taxing power if it wanted to. 294 More generally, any Congress
aware of NFIB’s action–inaction rule could avoid that limit with trivially
simple drafting precautions, merely by expressing a mandate as a condition
on commercial activity. “No person shall be permitted to buy bread or milk
or gasoline, unless that person either carries health insurance or pays a mon-
etary assessment” is a regulation of people already involved in commerce. So
even if the Court had invalidated the ACA on the strength of the action–
inaction distinction, that internal limit might have been a limit good for at-
tacking national legislation on one occasion and one occasion only.
291. Id .
292. For a more detailed argument that Roberts’s argument for the individual mandate’s
“greatness” is a “mere tautology,” see Schwartz, Limits of Enumerationism, supra note 4, at
613–17.
293. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 566 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id . at 589 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
294. Id . at 661–62, 668–69 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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2. Crossing the Street
The weakness of the internal-limit arguments about action and inaction
in NFIB raises this question: why did so many constitutional lawyers, includ-
ing eventually five justices of the Supreme Court, come to find those argu-
ments persuasive? Part of the explanation surely lies with many people’s
passionate opposition to the ACA. Across the political spectrum, thoughtful
people acting in good faith often overestimate the merits of legal arguments
the results of which they like. 295 For many opponents of the ACA, the ac-
tion–inaction argument offered a ready vehicle for articulating strong oppo-
sition to an unwanted law, an opposing-party president, or both. That said,
we do not think that the impulse to articulate constitutional opposition to
the ACA was entirely attributable to policy distaste for the ACA or partisan
antipathy toward President Obama. There were also other reasons why con-
stitutional skepticism toward the individual mandate resonated.
Some of those reasons were rooted in an inchoate but powerful sense
that the mandate was at odds with the American constitutional tradition.
The justices who ultimately endorsed the Commerce Clause objection to the
ACA wrote that the individual mandate was suspect because it was novel. 296
Whether the ACA was in fact novel is a contestable proposition. 297 But the
justices’ sense that it was novel and that its novelty was troubling bespoke
their intuition, right or wrong, that the ACA ran against the accumulated
wisdom of the past.
We do not think that the accumulated wisdom of constitutional history,
or anything else, would have justified a decision to strike down the ACA. We
do think, however, that well-socialized constitutional lawyers could reasona-
bly feel that something about the individual mandate was in tension with
American constitutional tradition. That tension had nothing to do with a
distinction between action and inaction. Instead, we suggest that a signifi-
cant but unrecognized source of constitutional unease about the individual
mandate was the traditional idea that we are calling the corporate nondele-
gation doctrine.
The individual mandate was not simply a command to do something.
Nor even a command to buy something. It was a command to buy some-
thing from large private corporations. As we explained in Part III, concern
about the dangers involved when the federal government puts its muscle di-
295. See, e .g ., Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Princi-
ples, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–
23 (2011) (giving an overview of the causes of motivated reasoning in constitutional law). We
do it, too.
296. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 549 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“Legislative novelty is not neces-
sarily fatal; there is a first time for everything. But sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a]
severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
505 (2010)).
297. See, e .g ., Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1447 (2017).
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rectly behind private corporations has done important work in American
constitutional history. To many people, that aspect of the ACA felt wrong,
even if it was not easy to articulate the reason in textual or doctrinal terms.
Consider how Judge Jeffrey Sutton wrote about the mandate when a case
challenging the ACA was before the Sixth Circuit. At the end of a long and
perceptive analysis, Judge Sutton concluded that the mandate and the ACA
were constitutional. 298 But he also gave memorable expression to the intui-
tion that something about the mandate seemed constitutionally off. In a part
of his opinion distinguishing between the ACA’s individual mandate and
other affirmative commands that the federal government issues to private
citizens, such as the duty to serve as a juror or to register for the draft, Judge
Sutton wrote:
To argue that Congress’s power to enlist individuals to defend the country’s
borders proves that it may enlist individuals to improve the availability of
medical care gives analogy a bad name. There is a difference between draft-
ing a citizen to join the military and forcing him to respond to a price quote
from Aetna. 299
Judge Sutton did not explore the substance of that difference. He assumed,
justifiably, that readers would share his intuition without its having to be ex-
plained—and perhaps even without quite being able to articulate its basis.
But the basis for that intuition need not be mysterious, so long as one is will-
ing to locate constitutional intuitions in historical attitudes not codified in
the written Constitution.
The intuition Judge Sutton articulated is rooted in a traditional distaste
for clothing large private corporations with the power of federal law. That
distaste goes back to the nineteenth century: note the resemblance between
the individual mandate and the “taxless financing” of corporations that
Democratic-Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats despised. 300 The essence
of such taxless finance was that the government conferred special privileges
on a private corporation in exchange for that corporation’s providing some
sort of public service. In the case of transportation infrastructure, the gov-
ernment provided private corporations with exclusive rights to tolls or pub-
lic land, and the corporations built bridges, canals, and railroads for the
public. In the case of the Bank of the United States, Congress gave a private
corporation the lucrative privilege of holding the government’s revenue and
acting as its fiscal agent, and the corporation facilitated the provision of
credit and currency to the private economy. These schemes had considerable
attractions. They allowed the government to produce the policy benefits it
sought without having to raise funds through taxation. But they also made
federal politics a forum where corporate interests could seek sweetheart
298. Thomas More L. Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565–66 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by
NFIB, 567 U.S. at 561.
299. Id . at 559.
300. See supra Section III.B.
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deals, thus provoking both fury and constitutional ideology from Andrew
Jackson and his followers. 301
The ACA’s individual mandate was a form of taxless financing. If Con-
gress had the necessary political will, it could eliminate the private health in-
surance sector and insure all Americans directly, in a single-payer system,
using money raised with taxation. Even the joint dissenters in NFIB agreed
that such a system would be constitutional. 302 But instead, Congress ar-
ranged for private corporations to provide the needed insurance. Those cor-
porations had to get something in return, something bestowed by federal
law: increased revenue from citizens now forced to carry private insurance.
And in states where only a small number of insurance companies sold poli-
cies on the ACA-defined insurance exchange, those corporations gained
both a guaranteed revenue stream and some degree of monopoly power. 303
The historical analogies are not hard to spot.
In this light, consider the significance of Congress’s choice not to in-
clude a “public option” in the ACA. During its deliberations, Congress con-
sidered having the federal government itself act as one of the insurers in the
marketplace. Citizens could then choose to buy insurance from a private
corporation or, if they preferred, to exercise the “public option” and buy di-
rectly from the government. 304 Like the Independent Treasury System
championed by hard-money Jacksonian Democrats, 305 the public option
would have weakened the delegation of power to private corporations, thus
allaying suspicions that private corporations would exploit their special priv-
ilege for undeserved financial gain. But proposals to create a public option
were blocked by a filibuster threat from Senator Joseph Lieberman, who co-
incidentally or not represented the state in which many major insurance
companies were headquartered at the time. 306 One might plausibly analogize
Lieberman’s role to the pro-banking “soft money” Democrats who prevailed
on Jackson to adopt a “pet bank” system in which certain favored state-
301. For a description of the fears of corruption surrounding such exclusive privileges,
see supra Section III.A; John Joseph Wallis, Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption:
American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 211 (2005).
302. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519, 661–62, 668–69 (2012) (Scal-
ia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
303. Jessica Van Parys, ACA Marketplace Premiums Grew More Rapidly in Areas with
Monopoly Insurers than in Areas with More Competition, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1243 (2018); Anna
Wilde Mathews & Stephanie Armour, Health Insurers’ Pullback Threatens to Create Monopo-
lies, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2016, 7:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurers-
pullback-threatens-to-create-monopolies-1472408338 [https://perma.cc/JK4E-G6CR].
304. See Robert B. Reich, Opinion, Why We Need a Public Health-Care Plan, WALL ST. J.
(June 24, 2009, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124580516633344953
[https://perma.cc/XT2U-2652].
305. See supra Section III.B.
306. Manu Raju, Lieberman: I’ll Block Vote on Reid Plan, POLITICO (Oct. 27, 2009, 1:38
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2009/10/lieberman-ill-block-vote-on-reid-plan-028788
[https://perma.cc/37AV-KW2T].
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chartered banks would receive the right to hold federal revenue. 307 And with
the public option gone, the ACA presented itself to previously uninsured cit-
izens in the form of large private corporations holding out their hands for
payment, on the authority of the federal government.
For people who would like to understand why so many Americans were
primed to conclude that the individual mandate was unconstitutional, the
tradition of corporate nondelegation is significantly more illuminating than
the action–inaction distinction on offer in NFIB. Unlike the idea that the
commerce power has a built-in distinction between action and inaction,
which was newly minted by (very smart) anti-ACA lawyers, 308 the corporate
nondelegation idea is authentically a long-standing feature of American con-
stitutionalism. Rather than resting on a dodgy inference about superfluous
text and some forced readings of case law, it goes to the practical substance
of what might be problematic about the individual mandate. What’s more,
the fact that the corporate nondelegation doctrine is an idea about federalism
also helps explain one of the puzzles about attitudes toward the ACA outside
the courts: how so many people who believed the ACA’s individual mandate
abominable could have a different intuition about the state-level individual-
mandate system created by Massachusetts. 309 One could say, as critics often
did, that the difference is simply that states have general police power and
the federal government doesn’t. 310 But we suspect that the vehemence with
which some people who accepted the Massachusetts mandate reviled the
federal one calls for some additional explanation. To be sure, we do not say
that the corporate nondelegation doctrine completely explains the phenom-
enon. But that doctrine has always been based on fears about the kinds of
corruption to which Congress is distinctly vulnerable.
The corporate nondelegation doctrine is also better able than the action–
inaction distinction to deliver the benefits of federalism, including the foster-
ing of a constitutional truce between a party in power and a party out of
power. The action–inaction distinction marshaled in NFIB seemed custom-
tailored to eliminate one law opposed by one party. It offered something im-
portant to the people on one side of the partisan divide and nothing to the
307. See supra Section III.B; HOFSTADTER, supra note 210, at 79–80.
308. See Richard Primus, The Most Revealing Word in the United States Reports, 22
GREEN BAG 2D 333, 333 (2019) (adducing evidence from within NFIB’s joint dissent that the
action–inaction distinction had not been substantively present in prior commerce cases).
309. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 598–99 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (describing the
Massachusetts mandate); Brief of Members of the U.S. Senate & Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives John Boehner as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21–22, Florida
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021) [herein-
after Brief of Members of the U.S. Senate]; Amici Curiae Brief of the Am. Ctr. for L. & Just. et
al. in Support of Respondents & Urging Affirmance on the Minimum Coverage Provision,
Otherwise Known as the Individual Mandate, Issue at 32, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-398) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief of the Am. Ctr. for L. & Just.].
310. See, e .g ., Brief of Members of the U.S. Senate, supra note 309, at 21–22; Amici Curiae
Brief of the Am. Ctr. for L. & Just., supra note 309, at 32.
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other. Indeed, given the ease with which that formal distinction can be over-
come by a legislature that knows it needs to comply with that rule, the ac-
tion–inaction distinction did not offer either party any plausible assurance
that the same rule would protect their interests in the future. (An alternative-
universe Republican Congress that wanted to make all Americans purchase
firearms could enact a law prohibiting the purchase of goods in interstate
commerce, except for people who own firearms; an alternative-universe
Democratic Congress could use the same strategy to make all Americans
purchase KN95 face masks during a pandemic.) In contrast, the idea that
federal delegations to private corporations are suspect has resonance for
people across party lines. In the past, it appealed to Jacksonian Democrats
and McKinley Republicans, to Brandeis and to McReynolds. In the twenty-
first century, it offers something to the proto–Tea Party Republicans who
protested bank bailouts in 2008 and something to the left-leaning Democrats
who call for an antioligarchical constitution. 311
Again, our point is not that the Court should have held the individual
mandate unconstitutional on the strength of the corporate nondelegation
doctrine. The mandate’s corporate delegation aspect might make it suspect,
but as we have explained, the “suspect spheres” approach does not purport
to create hard external limits on congressional power, to be enforced by
courts in the exercise of judicial review. In nonjudicial policymaking, it of-
fers a resource to decisionmakers trying to craft law that makes American
federalism the best that it can be. Congressional attention to the corporate
delegation problem while the ACA was pending would have counseled sup-
port for the public option, or for a single-payer system, or for comprehensive
rate regulation preventing insurers’ decisions from becoming a law unto the
consumer in jurisdictions where competition was thin, or for something else
that avoided creating a federal law compelling ordinary citizens to supply
revenue for large private insurers—and exacerbating political opposition to
what was already a bitterly contested proposal. In the courts, the corporate
nondelegation doctrine should not support hard external limits, but it can
inspire softer ones, like clear-statement rules or caution in finding state laws
preempted. But there was no valid room for such measures on the question
of the ACA’s individual mandate. Congress deliberated extensively and
wrote a law that clearly established the minimum coverage requirement.
Under those conditions, and in the absence of hard constitutional limits
from some other source, courts should get out of the way. So we agree again
with Judge Sutton, who, despite his implicit criticism of laws requiring peo-
ple to respond to price quotes from Aetna, ultimately concluded that the
powers of Congress were sufficient for enacting the ACA.
The adoption of the action–inaction idea by five justices in NFIB is thus
doubly unfortunate. First, by rewarding the development of an internal-limit
311. Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, and the Constitution
of Opportunity, in WEALTH: NOMOS LVIII 45 (Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg eds.,
2017).
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strategy ostensibly based on the text of Section 8, it gave credence to the no-
tion that the enumerated powers of Congress are an important feature of
American federalism. That notion is misleading. We would be better off let-
ting it go. Second, by vindicating the idea that whatever constitutional un-
ease people felt about the individual mandate was attributable to its falling
on the wrong side of a metaphysical divide between activity and inactivity, it
deflected attention from the possibility that something more substantive was
at work. If we paid more attention to that substantive thing, we might make
better decisions in the future—both in the specific context of health insur-
ance policy and in the general project of federalism.
CONCLUSION
Some bad habits die hard. The practice of looking to the Constitution’s
enumeration of congressional powers as if that enumeration said something
important about American federalism is deeply rooted, and many constitu-
tional lawyers would find it difficult to give it up. It is not hard to see why.
Textual arguments can give both the decisionmaker and the audience the
sense of “real law” in the form of a positive enactment that can be traced
back to an authoritative moment of lawmaking. Where the text in question is
Article I, the appeal is all the greater, both because the relevant lawmaking
moment has the exalted status of the constitutional founding and because
American constitutional culture has long treated the idea of a limiting enu-
meration as a sacred creed. But under careful examination, the idea of the
limiting enumeration turns out to be largely illusory. In reality, American
federalism is and has long been mostly a federalism of process and a federal-
ism of nontextual external limits.
To be sure, constitutional decisionmakers determined to make the tex-
tual enumeration of congressional powers into a device imposing meaning-
ful limits on Congress could find ways of doing so. Excellent constitutional
lawyers are often wonderfully creative readers of the Constitution’s text. But
the limiting interpretations of Congress’s powers that courts might read into
that text are unlikely to recover any principles of federalism authentically
placed there by the Framers or to instantiate principles of federalism that
would be sensible in light of the actual workings of modern American gov-
ernment. 312 Instead, interpreters who purport to discover sensible rules of
federalism by making negative inferences from the enumeration of congres-
sional powers are more likely, in perfectly good faith, to present something
that is not reasonably identified as a principle of constitutional federalism
(for example, a distinction between activity and inactivity within the regula-
tion of commerce) as if it actually were. To put the point a little polemically,
that is a bit like picking up a pebble from under the lamppost, handing it to
312. Unless the interpreters were actually reasoning practically about modern federalism,
constructing principles that made sense in light of that reasoning, and finding ways to read the
constitutional text to yield those principles. We do not understand most defenders of the idea
of a limiting enumeration to have that process in mind.
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the drunk man, and saying “Here is your wallet.” It purports to get the job
done by finding the thing sought in the place where people were looking. But
the thing found will not do the work that it is supposed to do.
Rather than making misdirected arguments about the internal limits of
textually enumerated powers, we recommend that constitutional deci-
sionmakers ask a better set of questions. What are the distinctive pathologies
of congressional lawmaking relative to local lawmaking? Is it possible to an-
swer that question in ways that support principled limits that would reduce,
rather than exacerbate, the tension between the party in power and the party
out of power? If so, can public decisionmakers act on those principles in
ways appropriate to their institutional roles?
Our example of the corporate nondelegation doctrine illustrates how
such a principle might function. We leave it to readers to judge whether the
example helps make the suspect-spheres approach plausible. If it does, schol-
ars of federalism should try to identify other such principles and to work out
the institutional arrangements for enforcing them. And if it does not, the
implication cannot be a return to the seductive comfort of enumerated pow-
ers. It must instead be a commitment to think of better ways of identifying
external limits—or else to abandon entirely the idea of substantive federal-
ism-based constitutional limits on national lawmaking. However hard it is to
search the other side of the street, nothing useful will be found under the
lamppost.
